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Abstract
 
Television allows an intimacy between a presidential
 
candidate and the public which was not available before this
 
technology was introduced into millions of American homes.
 
This can be an asset to a candidate who is adept at an
 
intimate, self-disclosive style (which is compatible with
 
television), or it can be a detriment to the candidate who
 
demonstrates physical signs of stress and presents a guarded
 
demeanor. A candidate who understands how to manipulate the
 
medium of television by employing a speaking style and
 
mannerisms conducive to it can inspire the public's
 
confidence in his or her ability to lead. Such an
 
understanding also helps candidates project and reinforce
 
the image of themselves that they have formed for voters.
 
In order to examine the evolution of image-making and
 
projection of that image through television, this thesis
 
will evaluate two presidential candidates, John F. Kennedy
 
and Bill Clinton, will be evaluated. The thirty-year
 
difference between their campaigns and the well-documented
 
similarity between the two candidates provides a reasonable
 
basis for comparison.
 
Through an evaluation of the creation of these two
 
candidates' images, as well as their projection of those
 
images during one of the televised debates in each of their
 
campaigns, this thesis will show that, although the basic
 
IV
 
 components of image-inaking have ri in three
 
deCades--negatives are still minimized and positives are
 
still acGentuated--the manner in which a cahdidate ptrojects
 
that image in a televised preeidential campaign debate has
 
changed from a formal to a more informal style. Further,
 
brevity of response now charaGterizes such debates. These
 
chahges have been brought about by the medium of television
 
itself/which causes voters to b ehgaged by image than
 
issues and causes candidates to place as much importance on
 
their image as the issues they present.
 
A Brief History of Political Debate
 
Political debate has always been at the foundation of
 
the American political system. The Founding Fathers
 
believed a government should be accountable to its people
 
and devised a system of checks and balances to insure that
 
accountability: "At the heart of 'checks and balances' was
 
a confidence in the ability of the best ideas to triumph if
 
strongly presented by forceful advocates in a fair forum"
 
(Jamieson, Presidential Debates 11). The power and ^
 
necessity of a public exchange of ideas fuels American
 
democracy and accounts for the continual evolution of
 
political debate into its present form.
 
An examination of the history of political debate in
 
this country can provide a backdrop against which to assess
 
current political debates. , Voter expectations, government
 
regulations, and the rise of the broadcast media have all
 
contributed to the changes that have occurred since our
 
nation's infancy.
 
Initially, political debate was not as public as it is
 
today. Many of the great debates of the past were not held
 
before an audience of voters but in the closed chambers of
 
the Constitutional Convention, colonial and state
 
assemblies, or the Congress. When a debate was conducted
 
publicly, it was usually issue-oriented, such as slavery in
 
the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, and tariffs in the
 
Cleveland-Harrison election of 1888. However, no direct
 
debates were held between presidential candidates at that
 
time, because it was considered bad manners to appeal
 
directly to the common voter.
 
The most popular method for a presidential candidate to
 
campaign during the 19th century was to have a surrogate do
 
the speaking for him. A presidential stand-in was usually a
 
prominent member of Congress or a major political figure
 
within the state that was being targeted for votes. This
 
surrogate would conduct public speeches at various locations
 
in which important issues and party affiliation were
 
emphasized.
 
Stephen Douglas was the first presidential candidate to
 
personally conduct a nationwide campaign and was widely
 
criticized for breaking new ground. Minow and Sloan
 
document disapproval for this new style of campaigning when
 
they report the disparaging remarks directed at Douglas by
 
various newspaper reports
 
Douglas 'demeans himself as no other candidate
 
yet has,' complained one newspaper; he 'goes about
 
begging, imploring, and beseeching the people to
 
grant him his wish.' Observed another: 'Douglas
 
is going about peddling his opinions as a tin man
 
peddles his wares. The only excuse for him is
 
that since he is a small man he has a right to be
 
engaged in small business, and small business it
 
is for a candidate for the presidency to be
 
strolling around the country begging for votes
 
like a town constable' (6).
 
This quote sharply contrasts Americans' expectations of
 
their presidential candidates in the 19th century with what
 
they are today. In the last century, national politics were
 
still considered to be in the domain of an elite gentry—
 
carefully selected pillars of the community who were
 
assigned to the electoral college in order to cast the best
 
vote for their party. Douglas upset the status quo because
 
it was considered unseemly and demeaning for a member of
 
this gentry to be mingling with the common rabble, much less
 
to be beseeching them for their vote. It was also
 
considered unnecessary, since he was well-known by the
 
members of the electoral college who would be casting their
 
votes. Yet, when the reporter in the above quote wrote that
 
Douglas was "peddling his opinions as a tin man peddles his
 
wares," he captured the essence of what» American
 
presidential campaigning was to become. Beginning in the
 
mid-20th century, the candidate would not only peddle his
 
opinions, but peddle himself like one of the many products
 
advertised on television.
 
Part of the underlying assumption in the creation of
 
the electoral college was that most Americans did not have
 
enough access to and knowledge of the presidential
 
candidates to cast an informed vote. Only with the
 
appearance of broadcast media did voters begin to receive
 
easier access to political candidates.
 
Beginning with radio, political messages were, for the
 
first time, spoken in the prospective, voter's living room
 
rather than on a country stage or an auditorium. Not only
 
did radio give iDoth candidates and constituency greater
 
access to each other, hut it also caused Gandidates to
 
change their message to meet the Gircumstances of this hew
 
forum. When voters had to travel long distances (by walking
 
or using a horse and buggy) to hear a political debate on
 
stage, they were more likely to listen for the duration
 
because of the amount of effort required to attend the
 
event. When radio brought political messages into the
 
voters' homes, however, political candidates (or their
 
stand-ins) were forced to give shorter, more "entertaining"
 
messages to keep the attention of the radio audience.
 
Even with the available use of radio, however,
 
candidates did not feel compelled to debate esch other over
 
the air waves. Incumbents realized they had nothing to gain
 
by engaging their opponents in verbal exchanges. Swerdlow
 
explains the tendency of incumbent presidents in the first
 
half of this century to remain secure in their position by
 
avoiding their opponent
 
...they [incumbents] follow a strategy of
 
minimal exposure to voter and press scrutiny....
 
When presidential candidates met or came close to
 
meeting during campaigns, the country's press and
 
opinion makers--in sharp contrast to their
 
present-day attitudes--encouraged
 
nonconfrOntational gentlemanly demeanor (10),
 
However, as more and more senatorial and presidential
 
candidates began using radio as a means to reach voters, the
 
inevitable encounters between candidates began occurring
 
over the air waves. Although no presidential candidates
 
faced-off during an electoral campaign on radio. Republican
 
candidates Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey debated on May
 
17, 1948 in their bid for their party's presidential
 
nomination.
 
The debate was broadcast by ABC, NBC, and Mutual radio
 
"to an audience estimated at between 40 and 80 million. One
 
of the largest audiences in radio history had abandoned the
 
'Carnation Contented Hour' and Fred Waring to listen to
 
Stassen and Dewey" (Presidential Debates 90). The debate
 
proved to be Stassen's undoing.
 
The significance of the Stassen-Dewey debate is that it
 
drew listeners into a new dimension of judging the personal
 
chracteristicss of the debaters, something that wasn't
 
relevant when listening to surrogates debate their party's
 
platform. Not only was the validity of the arguments
 
weighed, but also the candidates' ability to respond well
 
under stress, appear fair and compassionate, and speak more
 
eloquently. The audience was afforded a new list of factors
 
with which to judge the candidates, when voters decided
 
which candidate to vote for according to their party's
 
platform, it was the content of the message that held
 
prominence in the voters' minds. However, when candidates
 
themselves debated issues in the voters' living rooms via
 
the radio, not only the message was judged, but the delivery
 
and believability of the candidate as well.
 
This new method of candidate analysis was greatly
 
increased with the advent of television, when Kennedy and
 
Nixon engaged in the first televised presidential debates,
 
voters judged not only how the candidates sounded, but how
 
they looked and moved. Assessment of candidates' perceived
 
character became more important than the issues, which were
 
foremost in voters' minds when candidates kept themselves
 
hidden from sight, sound and conflict and had surrogates
 
carry their case to the public.
 
Not only did television provide voters with more
 
factors with which to assess candidates, but it also created
 
new expectations of what candidates should be like due
 
solely to the technology of television. In fact, television
 
has so much changed Americans' expectations of how a
 
political candidate should be that, according to Ranney,
 
"being 'good on television' has become one of the first
 
requirements...for being a successful candidate for
 
nomination and election to the presidency, a governorship, a
 
seat in the U.S. Senate, or any office with a constituency
 
that encompasses one or more television markets" (102). The
 
result is that campaign managers must now have a thorough
 
understanding of how to work with the broadcast media in
 
order to present their candidates positively to the public.
 
But what does it mean to be "good on television"? It
 
means looking good, i.e., appearing healthy and confident
 
which promotes confidence in the viewer. It also means
 
knowing what sort of rhetorical delivery television
 
requires. Ranney quotes political media specialist Tony
 
Schwartz, who observes that
 
the kind of personality, appearance, and
 
speaking style that inspires standing ovations
 
from crowds of thousands in auditoriums is quite
 
different from the kind that inspires liking and
 
confidence from a few people sitting in front of a
 
television set in their own homes. The auditorium
 
situation calls for a commanding presence, a
 
strong voice projected at a high volume, large
 
gestures, and dramatic punch lines with plenty of
 
pauses for cheers. The TV-room situation'calls
 
for a pleasant and friendly presence, a moderate
 
tone of voice, small and natural gestures, and a
 
general conversational manner. (103)
 
Thus, the candidate who speaks on television as he or she
 
would in a living room of a few people is more likely to
 
gain a favorable consensus from the public, because this
 
type of presentation, being more natural in a private
 
setting, puts Viewers at ease, if a candidate were speaking
 
in a booming voice and waving his arms around, it would be
 
as much an affront as if this were taking place right in
 
front of the viewer instead Of in an auditorium. Issues
 
aside, a voter would be hesitant to vote for a person to
 
lead the country if that candiidate did not know how to
 
present him^^^ for according to the situation.
 
Thus it is that with candidates being brought into
 
voters' living rooms through television, image began to
 
override issues in importance. Issues were of importance
 
when voters did not see or heat the candidates except from a
 
great distance On a country stage. When voters began to be
 
exposed to candidates closh up on a dail# basis throtigh
 
television, different judgment factors began to hold sway.
 
John F. Kennedy W tbe first ptesidehtiai Cahdidate to
 
have a full awareness pf tbe; power Of promoting an pyetall
 
image of himself above any party Ol^formi Throhgh use of
 
the media to promote his image, he set a precedent which
 
subsequent political candidates copied. It was Kennedy's
 
"image-making" which, according to Brown, dissolved ''the
 
barriers between the private and public realms'' (70), Brown
 
explains the effects of this type of campaiohihg as fo
 
Largely as a result of the media of mass
 
communication, the process of voting has become
 
more and more analogous to the consumer's "choice"
 
of commodities. Increasingiy/ to cast a vote for
 
a candidate is seen as an act of Self-definition
 
in which one seiects an ''image'' suppdsedly
 
Smbleinatic of one's ''iaSte'' and ''lifestyle'' (70).
 
Brown cites tha Kennedys as being the pioneers of the"new
 
politics of style" throhgh theif use of magazines and :
 
television to turn good looks and glamour into political
 
assets. The Kennedy campaign of image over issues set the
 
tone for future political campaigns.
 
Certainly, such emphasis on a candidate's image calls
 
for a new understanding of rhetoric that encompasses more
 
than merely a candidate's careful choice of words in
 
persuading voters. This new rhetoric must also include how
 
a candidate is presented for public yiewihg, i.e., in what
 
setting a candidate is seen, with what people, for what
 
reason. . ■ 
The rhetorician Kenneth Burke has aptly framed this new
 
type of persuasion within his rhetorical conception of
 
"identification." With this theory, candidates cause others
 
to identify themselves not only with what is said through
 
speeches, but also with what "properties" they surround
 
themselves with. Burke explains the importance of the
 
overall image a candidate presents when he writes
 
For a "good" rhetoric neglected by the press
 
cannot be so "communicative" as a poor rhetoric
 
backed nation--wide by headlines. And often we
 
must think of rhetoric not in terms of some one
 
particular address, but as a general body of
 
identifications that owe their convincingness much
 
more to trivial repetition and dull daily
 
reinforcement than to exceptional rhetorical
 
skill. (1022)
 
Televised presidential debates have now become the
 
norm. Voters expect it, for these debates are the only time
 
they are allowed to judge the candidates for themselves as
 
they appear in a somewhat spontaneous setting, holding each
 
other accountable for their views.
 
Candidates have been known to ignore or change campaign
 
promises, but a person does not so easily change his or her
 
way of acting or being. Thus, the televised debates provide
 
a setting for voters to determine how each candidate might
 
perform in any future situation that might occur during that
 
person's pres idency.
 
As will be shown, political campaigns have become a
 
battle of candidate images. A candidate's image, as well as
 
the candidate's personal life, is stressed over issues, and
 
campaign staffs' attempts to present candidates who conform
 
to whatever image the public expects. The climax bf this
 
imags-makiug occurs during the televised presidential
 
debate, when carididates must, at all costs, hold onto and
 
project that image of themselves which has been molded to
 
please the public.
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An Analysis of Clinton's and Kennedy's Campaign Image
 
Political candidates, in order to be elected, must
 
assure the electorate that they are capable leaders.
 
Incumbents have the benefit of their track record in office
 
if, indeed, their actions have received favorable public
 
notice. But even with a good record, a candidate must still
 
re-establish, in the public's eye, a position of superiority
 
over any new contenders for the job.
 
To obtain the position of frontrunner in a campaign, a
 
candidate must not only assure voters of his or her ability
 
to perform the job, but, more importantly, convey a total
 
image of him or herself as trustworthy, competent and
 
likeable. To this end, a campaign becomes not only a
 
concerted effort to reach as many voters as possible with a
 
candidate's message, but an image formation and promotion as
 
well.
 
A candidate's image is "created" by accentuating his or
 
her positives and minimizing the negatives. How this is
 
done is greatly determined by the mood and expectations of
 
the voters during the particular time period that the
 
campaign is waged. Voter expectations of a candidate that
 
have been determined to be most important are explained by
 
Jamieson
 
Trait-based explanations of voting tell us what
 
we say we look for. When asked what they liked
 
and disliked about the presidential contenders,
 
approximately one-fourth of the American public
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has reported such personal traits as warmth,
 
honesty, or interiigence. Among the traits
 
routinely appeat assessments of presidehtial
 
hopefuls are competence and integrity, of the
 
two, competence generally carries the greater
 
weight. Specific historical circumstances, such
 
as Watergate, can shift our focus to integrity,
 
however. Although the relationship may follow an
 
inverted U curve, we also expect presidents to be
 
knowledgeable (Presidential Debates 140).
 
Although "warmth" is not necessarily a required trait
 
for governing the country, a large block of American voters
 
view it as significiant in what they expect in a president.
 
Apparently, many voters would not vote for a candidate, no
 
rha^ how competent and trustworthy, if that candidate was
 
■aot/^iikeable. ':' . .'i 
John E; Kehhedy understopd tl^e importance of 
e^xplained by Joseph p. Berrv. Jr. in John f. Kennedy and the 
Media: The First Television President: "When speaking in 
pulDlic, Kennedy upderstopd that it is not simply 'what you 
say' that counts; 'how you say it' is also important... . 
simply stated, it is easier to persuade people to think your 
way if they like you as a person" (121) . 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson also stresses the importance of 
image over substantive issues and qualifications when she 
writes in Presidential Debates 
When voters report, as they have since the early 
1970s, that their voting decisions are more 
influenced by the character of the candidate than 
by stands on issues or party affiliation, they are 
revealing, in part, the extent to which party and 
promises are insufficient to allay the fears 
engendered by unfdrecast policies and 
unanticipated presidential behaviors. ... (4) . 
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Even Richard Nixon, after a poor showing in his
 
televised campaign debates with Kennedy, grasped the
 
importance of image over substance, saying
 
Unfortunately, in the television age a candidate's
 
appearance and style count for more than his ideas
 
and record.... An intelligent candidate who
 
follows his conscience and runs a campaign based
 
entirely on substance—who worries more about
 
getting his views across than about what color
 
shirt will look best on the evening news—is a
 
sure loser (Berry 37).
 
In summation of the importance of the candidate's image
 
over any substantive matters. Berry recommends that
 
candidates "create a politically sellable image; understand
 
that image is just as important, if not more important, than
 
one's stand on the issues" (147).
 
When a national campaign is waged by presidential
 
candidates, the most expedient method for creating and
 
promoting one's image is through the media, especially
 
television, since it can reach the greatest number of people
 
in the shortest amount of time. Clearly, a candidate who
 
understands how to manipulate the medium of television in
 
promoting his or her image will have an advantage over any
 
opponents. —
 
Given the peculiar demands of television in
 
transmitting a positive image to the modern audience, a more
 
contemporary definition of rhetoric is called for than the
 
traditional key term "persuasion" which has been assigned to
 
it. Kenneth Burke expands the definition of rhetoric with
 
13
 
his theory of 'Vi!dentification/" Which^
 
corresponds to the rhetorical knowledge a televised
 
political candidate must emipldy to gain the attehtion an
 
.;re!Spect^?df- voters. Burke vjrltes /
 
Rhetoric is the art of per or a study of
 
the means of persuasion available for any given
 
situation.... AS for the relation betwean
 
'identification' and 'persm Well
 
keep it in mind that a fspeaker p
 
audience by the use of stylistlG identific^^
 
his act of persuasion may be for the purpbse of
 
Gs^'Stng the audience t identify itself with the
 
speaker's interests; ahd the speaker draws Pii
 
identification of interests to ests^iish rapport
 
between himself and his audience IThe Rhetorical
 
Tradition 1034).
 
Television must certainly be considered by late 20th
 
century presidential candidates to be the most potent "means
 
of persuasion available,'' and a study of what is effective
 
in this medium is necessary to achieve frontrunner status.
 
This medium can prbve extremely detrimental to the candidate
 
(such as Nix^ in the first 1960 televised debate) who does
 
not understahd its peduliar effect upon an audience.
 
The establishment of rapport, through a candidate's
 
presentation of his or her interests in a way that will
 
cause the audience to identify with those interests, is also
 
best done through the medium of television, due to its
 
ability to create a feeling of intimacy between viewer and
 
viewed. Because the television audience is viewing the
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candidate close-up in their own living room, this intimacy
 
is expected.
 
Theodore H. White echoes Burke's philosophy in a more
 
practical manner in The Making of the President i960 when he
 
writes, "To become known, to be identifiable to voters in
 
terms of their own gut reactions, is perhaps the most
 
expensive and necessary condition of American Presidential
 
politics" (33).
 
It will be shown in this chapter how both John F.
 
Kennedy and Bill Clinton surrrounded themselves with those
 
properties (as defined by Burke) which identified them with
 
the constituency which eventually elected them president.
 
Both men, along with their advisors, carried out a concerted
 
image-making campaign of accentuating their positives and
 
minimizing their negatives in order to get elected.
 
Although these tw<3 men are no different from other
 
presidential candidates who create an image of themselves
 
for the purpose of being elected, their situations are
 
intriguing because their youth, as well as other factors,
 
created a similarity in their image promotion, while the
 
thirty-year difference in their campaigns provides an
 
interesting contrast with which to discern evolving
 
differences in styles of campaign image-making.
 
* * *
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Joseph Kennedy, Sr. knew all too well that in order for
 
his eldest son, John Fitzgerald, to win the presidency, it
 
would be necessary to create a positive image of him and
 
broadcast it across America. "We're going to sell Jack like
 
soap flakes," (Berry 42) he announced to a friend. The
 
elder Kennedy realized that his son's assets (athletic,
 
youthful appearance; heroic war record; Pulitzer prize­
winning book; name recognition; and charisma) must be
 
amplified, and his negative aspects (Catholic religion, poor
 
health, apparent lack of experience) must either be
 
transformed into assets or hidden.
 
As Berry explains it,"The media attention generated
 
after Kennedy's performance at the 1956 Democratic National
 
Convention encpuraged the senator to pursue the presidency.
 
Most of Kennedy's activities between 1956 and 1960 were
 
geared to developing a politically positive media image"
 
(43).
 
One of the biggest negative factors in Kennedy's image
 
to be overcome was his Catholic religion. The country had
 
never elected a Catholic president, and voters were fearful
 
that Kennedy's allegiance to the Pope might compromise his
 
duties as president. In effect, voters thought Kennedy's
 
election might mean that the Pope would be the de facto
 
leader of the U.S. Counteracting this fear was to be
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 Kennedy's first order of business, and he met the challenge
 
head-'on in the West Virginia primary.
 
Kennedy turned the religious issue to his advantage
 
with a tworprgnged approach. he needed to counteract
 
any fears that non-Catholics might have by presenting a
 
positive imag of himself to the West Vir voters.^
 
Theodore H. white describes the image-making tactic that
 
televisign helped effect in the primary
 
Up and down the roads roved Kennedy names,
 
brothers and sihtits all available fgr speeches
 
and:appearanceS; to the family names Was added the
 
lustrous name of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. Above
 
all, over and over again there was the
 
handsQme, open-faced candidate on the TV screen
 
showing himself, proving that a Catholic wears no
 
horns. The documentary film on TV opened with a
 
cut of a PT boat apraying a; white Wake thfghgh the
 
black night, and kennedy was a war hero; the film
 
next showed the quiet ybitng man holding a book in
 
his hand in his own library receiving the Pulitzer
 
l>rize, and he was a^;s the young man"
 
held his goldeh-cnrled daughter of two, reading to
 
V y 	h^ she sat on his lap, and he was the young
 
father; and always, gravely, open-eyed. With a
 
sincerity that could not be feigned, he would
 
explain his own devotion to the freedom of
 
America's faiths and the separation otbhurch and
 
state (108).
 
In addition to the television ad, Kennedy directly
 
confronted the voters' fears of Catholic religion in a paid
 
telecast on Sunday evening. May 8th. He used about ten
 
minutes of the half-hour show to discuss the religious
 
question. White recalled his speech, saying, "...Kennedy
 
spoke from the gut. He reviewed the long war of church on
 
state and state on church and that greatest of all
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 constitutional decisions: to separate church from state.
 
Then, peering into the camera and talking directly to the
 
people of West Virginia, he proceeded, as I remember, thus:
 
...so when any man stands on the steps of the
 
Capitol and takes the oath of office of President,
 
he ±s bearing to support the separa^ of church
 
and state; he puts one hand on the Bible and
 
raises the other hand to God as he takes the oath.
 
And if he breaks his oath, he is not only
 
committing a crime against the Constitution, for
 
which the Cohgress can impeach him—and should
 
impeach him—but he is committing asih against
 
, God.
 
Here, Kennedy raised his hand from an imaginary Bible, as if
 
lifting it to God, and, repeating softly, said, 'A sin
 
against God, for he has sworn on the Bible' " (107-108).
 
Not only did Kennedy present inescapable logic in this
 
telecast, for those who could grasp it, he also interjected
 
a strong visual with attendant emotion. It would be hard
 
for anyone watching him to doubt his reasoning or his
 
sincerity. And, by using the Bible as a prop for this
 
display, he forged a bond with the strongly Protestant West
 
Virginians. It was one of the strongest elements of his
 
Catholic religion which he could use to, in effect, tell
 
these voters, "I, like you, rely on the Bible in the
 
practice of my religion; we are the same."
 
The second way in which Kennedy turned the religious
 
issue to his advantage was to play on people's fears of
 
being labeled bigots. In essence, Kennedy replaced the
 
18
 
voters' fear of his Catholicism with the fear of being
 
referred to as bigots. David Burner explains in John F.
 
Kennedv and A New Generation how Kennedy did this: "He
 
brought [religion] up repeatedly, raising the issue of
 
bigotry in such a way as to put even nonbigots on the
 
defensive, as though any vote cast against him for any
 
reason would lead the media to label his opponents as
 
bigots." Burner adds, "That Nixon's own pastor, the
 
Reverend Norman Vincent Peale, condemned Kennedy on
 
religious grounds may have gained votes for the Democratic
 
candidate because much of the country was viewing the
 
election as an exorcism, once and for all time, of political
 
anti-Catholicism" (47).
 
Jamieson explained Kennedy's tactics in turning his
 
religion to his advantage as follows
 
In a brilliantly executed transformation, Kennedy
 
recast questions of religion as ones of tolerance.
 
A vote for Kennedy became a sign of open-

mindedness, a vote against him a potential sign of
 
bigotry.... By addressing the issue of religion in
 
question-and-answer sessions, first with voters in
 
televised five and one minute ads, then by
 
answering queries from FDR's namesake Franklin
 
Roosevelt Jr. in a televised half hour exchange,
 
Kennedy demonstrated that he did not need to clear
 
his statements with either Cardinal Cushing or the
 
Pope and also showed that he could withstand the
 
pressure of scrutiny by skeptics and their stand-

in FDR Jr. The tension of the encounters rivetted
 
attention and invited identification with Kennedy
 
as the candidate under siege and as the champion
 
of such American virtues as fairness, tolerance,
 
equal opportunity, freedom of religion, and
 
separation of church and state" (Packaging... 125­
126).
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The oyerwhelm^^^ Protestant West Virginians
 
aware that the rest of the country was watching and waiting
 
for their reaction to a Catholic presidential candidate,
 
White describes one woman he spoke to, who had switched her
 
yote to Kennedy, as saying, "We have enough trouble in We
 
Virginia, let alone to be called bigots> tog'' (108). T^^
 
tactics that Kennedy employed to make his cathglicisffl woyJ^
 
for him, as well as the labors of his highly organized a^^
 
innovative grassroots volunteer organizations, won him the
 
■'West'-'yifginia''Primary 
Four other factors entereia into the image-making 
campaign of Kennedy: his bad health, his ihexperience, his 
wife, and his need to prove to be the opposite of 
Eisenhower. Kennedy's team was hoping that the careful 
handling of each of these areas would create the uhdeniable 
image of a leader for the American people. 
Kennedy suffered a lifetime of illness/beginning in 
childhgod with scarlet fever and continuing through the 
years with jaundice, malaria, Addison's disease {an 
adrenalin ihsufficiehcy), and a bad back which required 
three operatidnsi When Addison's disease Was finally 
diagnosed> a family friend recalled that Kennedy was '^sg 
sick that it was an irritation for both of them, for his 
father and for himself. It threatened to get in the Way Cf 
everything they were trying to accomplish" (Parmet 192) . 
20 
Kennedy surmised, probably correctly, that Americans
 
would be more responsive to a young man of vibrant health
 
than one who needed daily doses of DOCA to maintain a
 
sufficient hormonal balance and who relied on the use of
 
crutches to ease his back pain. Thus, a concerted effort
 
was put forth to hide Kennedy's many ailments and paint a
 
picture of a healthy, tan, athletic young man ready to take
 
on the task of ruling America. Hidden from the public were
 
the many pills, the reading glasses, and the crutches;
 
revealed, instead, was the perpetually tan face, sailing
 
with his wife, playing football with his family,
 
barnstorming the country without a hat or coat—obvious
 
displays of vitality. His athleticism and energy were also
 
displayed in the constant retelling of his war hero efforts
 
when he swam for hours rescuing his crew members from the
 
sinking PT-109.
 
In describing the concealment of Kennedy's illness,
 
Parmet writes
 
Medical records were sealed and vague rumors about
 
Addison's could be satisfied with casual, assuring
 
explanations that there really was not much to it.
 
Photographers recorded the hatless and often
 
coatless vigorous-looking senator, accompanied by
 
a wife who obviously enhanced his portrait as a
 
man of accomplishments, and the writers did not
 
look much beyond the pictures (522).
 
Jamieson agrees that the public would not have favored
 
an unhealthy candidate for the presidency when she writes;
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 Had Kennedy's illness and the nature of his
 
medical regimen become public knowledge in the
 
1960 campaign, it might have changed the outcome
 
of the Democratic convention and, if not, surely
 
would have been a widely discussed and perhaps
 
decisive issue in the fall election, for
 
Eisenhower's heart attack, ileitis, and stroke had
 
raised the public's consciousness of the
 
importance of a candidate's health (Packaging...
 
: ^ 138
 
Instead of acknowledging the seriousness of Kennedy's
 
disease, the Kennedy campaign relied on the televised PT 109
 
ads to promote JFK as a man of leadership, vigor and
 
endurance. Anyone watching these ads could hot, according
 
to Jamieson, "seriously entertain the possibility that a man
 
who had survived the destruction of his FT boat, had towed
 
another man in the ocean for five miles, and had survived
 
nine days in the jungle could suffer from a supposedly
 
serious disease" (Packaging... 139).
 
. Another asset to Kennedy's image was his highly
 
accomplished and personable wife, Jacqueline. Unlike other
 
presidents' wives who created a name for themselves after
 
taking up residence in the White House, she became a
 
sensation during the campaign due to her youth, her beauty
 
and her style. Women across the country were copying her
 
trademark hats, hairdo and clothing. Parmet describes
 
Jacqueline's benefit to her husband as follows
 
The Kennedy women and teas were largely superceded
 
by personal visits throughout the state by
 
Jacqueline. Appearing both with her husband as
 
well as alone, she was thereby introduced to
 
campaign politics, her French especially helpful
 
with the large number of Massachusetts voters of
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Canadian origin. Her fluency with Italian was an
 
additional asset to Kennedy among an ethnic group
 
somewhat cooler to his appeal (452).
 
Certainly, the majority of women voters in 1960 were
 
housewives, not polished, international figures like Mrs.
 
Kennedy, but their desire to look like her indicated a
 
desire to identify themselves with what they imagined to be
 
her admirable persona. This sort of imitation of an icon
 
exemplified Burke's treatment of "identification" as a
 
methodology of "means."
 
One instance of how an individual might merge her
 
identity with a particular icon (in this case, Mrs. Kennedy)
 
would be to wear particular clothes or other "psychological
 
equivalents" (Holland 29). Modeling oneself after
 
Jacqueline Kennedy was a form of bragging by her emulators
 
in which they nonverbally pronounced, "I look like her,
 
therefore I am like her."
 
In order to keep this Jacqueline "myth" alive,American
 
women who admired Mrs. Kennedy would have to vote for John
 
F. Kennedy so that his wife would not fade from the public
 
eye and, thus, dissolve their own identification with her.
 
This sort of rhetorical identification was a clear example
 
of image over substance during the 1960 campaign.
 
Certainly, there is no mention of any international attempt
 
to copy Patricia Nixon's hairstyle or clothing. Because
 
John F. Kennedy used his wife's high visibility as part of
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essence, a Burkean prop, she was one more "means of
 
persuasion" available to Kennedy with which to win the
 
voters' favor.
 
Brown adds credence to this phenomena of image over
 
substance when he writes: "Increasingly, to cast a vote for
 
a candidate is seen as an act of self-definition in which
 
one selects an 'image' supposedly emblematic of one's
 
'taste' and 'lifestyle' " (70).
 
One negative side effect to the youthful appearance
 
that JFK and his wife put forth was that it strengthened the
 
opinion of some voters that Kennedy was too young and
 
inexperienced to lead the country. To counteract this
 
negative opinion and prove his competence, Kennedy took
 
every opportunity to point out that he and Nixon shared the
 
same number of years in public service: fourteen. In fact,
 
one of the reasons that Kennedy sought to enter into the
 
"Great Debates" with Nixon was to prove his competency on
 
the issues.
 
Another effective tactic which Kennedy employed to
 
remove his too youthful image was to inform the media of his
 
preference for being referred to as JFK or Kennedy. The use
 
of the initials JFK, of course, would draw comparisons in
 
the public's mind with FDR, a popular president who first
 
understood the impact of communicating directly with the
 
American people via radio.
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The careful manipulation of all of Kennedy's perceived
 
negative aspects (Catholic religion, bad health, apparent
 
inexperience) formed an image in the public's mind of a
 
young, handsome, athletic, brilliant and charismatic young
 
leader. Time magazine, in listing his attributes,
 
solidified this image for the country
 
So far. Jack Kennedy has gone on some of the most
 
highly visible assets in U.S. politics. At 40, he
 
is trim...and boyishly handsome, with a trademark
 
in the shock of unruly brown hair.... He belongs
 
to a legendary family that surpasses its
 
legend.... He is an authentic war hero and a
 
Pulitzer-prizewinning author.... He is an athlete
 
(during World War II his swimming skill saved his
 
life and those of his PT-boat mates); yet his
 
intellectual qualifications are such that his
 
photographer wife Jacqueline remarks...; 'If I
 
were drawing him, I'd draw a tiny body and an
 
enormous head.'... No stem-winding orator...,
 
Kennedy instead imparts a remarkable quality of
 
shy, sensemaking sincerity..." (Dec. 2, 1957, 18).
 
As a result of JFK's careful attention to his image
 
campaign as much as, or more than, his attention to issues,
 
the reaction of the people to him resembled the same
 
frenzied adoration reserved for Hollywood stars. Time. in
 
the same article, felt obliged to describe the hysteria
 
toward Kennedy in this way; "...Jack Kennedy has left
 
panting politicans and swooning women across a large spread
 
of the U.S" (17). The same article mentioned a University
 
of Minnesota student who gave Kennedy a message at a Young
 
Democrats' Convention from her fifty-eight sorority sisters;
 
25
 
"Every girl told me to give Senator Kennedy all her love and
 
to tell him they should all vote for him" (17).
 
Theodore H. White personally witnessed the celebrity
 
phenomenon that Kennedy inspired and describes the crowd
 
adulation as follows
 
One remembers being in a Kennedy crowd and
 
suddenly sensing far off on the edge of it a
 
ripple of pressure beginning, and the ripple,
 
which always started at the back, would grow like
 
a wave, surging forward as it gathered strength,
 
until it would squeeze the front rank of the crowd
 
against the wooden barricade, and the barricade
 
would begin to splinter;.... one remembers groups
 
along the road waving, the women unbinding
 
kerchiefs from their heads to wave.... one
 
remembers the grabbers, bursting through police
 
lines, trying to touch him or reach him, and the
 
squeezers who grasped his hand.... One remembers,
 
of course, the jumpers. The jumpers made their
 
appearance shortly after the first TV debate when
 
from a politican Kennedy had become, in the mind
 
of the bobby-sox platoons, a "thing"
 
combining... 'the best qualities of Elvis Presley
 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt' (330-331).
 
White also provides evidence of the great contrast
 
between Nixon's and Kennedy's effect upon an audience during
 
speaking engagements when he writes: "...out of doors the
 
Nixon crowds were incomparably more subdued than the Kennedy
 
crowds. Kennedy evoked an excitement, a response to
 
personality. Nixon held his crowds earnestly together in a
 
sober, intent frowning mass" (332).
 
Berry offers one possible explanation for Kennedy's
 
great appeal when he writes, "Why did Kennedy's appearance
 
create so much attention? The three presidents prior to
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himj Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, were balding older
 
In comparison to them, Kennedy^s youth and svelt good
 
looks made him seem even more attiractive than he Was" (51).
 
In fact, Kennedy did attempt tb create a greet gfulf in
 
the minds of Americans between his style and that of
 
Eisenhower. Rbbett G. Carlton, when writing about KeJ?^®'3;y,
 
his desire to distance himseif from Eisehhbwer in
 
^thiS:'- way :
 
From FDR he learned what to do, from Eisenhower he
 
leaifned what to avbid:.... He had Watched the
 
former presideht on television for eight years; he
 
greatiy disapproved of what he saw. In
 
particular^ he thought pictures of Eisenhower
 
golfing undermined his dignity, prolecting an
 
:v;;-'image'pf ^
'irivbliiy,
 
Although JFK thoroughly enjoyed playing golf> he would allow
 
no pictures to be taken of him en in this pastime in
 
order to preyent any asspciatibns of himSelf^^^^^^W Eisenhower
 
in the public's mind. Berry reinforces Carlton's comments,
 
saying, "...golf playing evoked images of Eisenhower's
 
sluggish country club days at the White House where he
 
dented the floors with his golf shoe spikes" (62).
 
Parmet offers an even more intriguing contrast between
 
Eisenhower and Kennedy when he explains the differences in
 
the associates of these two leaders
 
Interviewing Ike's associates invariably evokes
 
laudatory comments: praise for his geniality,
 
kindness, humanity, temperance. But the common
 
denominator centered on his love for the country
 
and value to America, his sense of duty, and his
 
ability to bind the wounds of the early 1950s just
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as he had handled delicate wartime alliances....
 
Kennedy intimates, equally loyal, sometimes
 
feverishly so, guard his memory in a 'cult of the
 
individual' fashion. Emphasizing his brilliance,
 
charm, wit, sophistication, he--rather than the
 
country—becomes the center of value. Eisenhower
 
presided over an institution; Kennedy, in his very
 
brief reign, was the institution (xvi).
 
Not,all Americans responded to the celebrity appeal of
 
Kennedy and some, in fact, questioned the place of such
 
mindless hysteria in the consideration of a candidate's
 
worthiness for office. Parmet quotes William V. Shannon of
 
the New York Post as writing in the Nov. 11, 1957 issue
 
There is a growing tendency on the part of
 
Americans to 'consume' political figures in much
 
the same sense we consume entertainment
 
personalities and in the movies.... Month after
 
month, from the glossy pages of Life to the
 
multicolored cover of Redbook. Jack and Jackie
 
Kennedy smile out at millions of readers; he with
 
his tousled hair and winning smile, she with her
 
dark eyes and beautiful face. We hear of her
 
pregnancy, of his wartime heroism, of their
 
fondness for sailing. But what has all this to do
 
with statemanship? (438).
 
The tendency of Americans to bestow "star status" on
 
their presidential candidates has not diminished with time.
 
Thirty years after Kennedy won over America, Bill Clinton
 
appeared, almost as a reincarnation of the young Kennedy.
 
Comparisons between the two were rampant. There was even a
 
photograph of President Kennedy shaking hands with the
 
unknown sixteen year old Bill Clinton on the White House
 
lawn. After Clinton's election, Howard Fineman drew
 
attention to the importance of the photograph when he called
 
it "...prophetic history. For it documents JFK reaching
 
28
 
history. For it documents JFK reaching across the years to
 
a boy he did not know—and to whom the torch of leadership
 
now passes in an emphatic statement of America's desire for
 
change" (5).
 
Bill Clinton, like Kennedy, waged a campaign of
 
accentuating his positives and minimizing his negatives.
 
Clinton's journey to the White House, however, involved
 
overcoming some of the most damaging, scandalous press that
 
any presidential candidate has had to face in recent
 
history. Joe Klein described Clinton's campaign, calling
 
him "a remarkably skilled and resilient politican, a man of
 
persistence and intelligence who has managed to survive a
 
personal ordeal unlike any other in the history of
 
presidential campaigning and showed more than his share of
 
grace under pressure in the process" (23).
 
Indeed, Clinton, like Kennedy, managed to make the bad
 
aspects of his image work for him to obtain more votes.
 
Unlike Kennedy, however, who entered the race already
 
knowing his detriments and with a battle plan for dealing
 
with them, Clinton was taken by surprise when a probing
 
press and a Republican party on the attack defined for him
 
what he needed to address.
 
Three major negative factors which threatened Clinton's
 
promotion of his leadership image during his campaign were:
 
(1) Gennifer Flowers' allegations of a twelve-year affair
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activities; and (3) Clinton's image as a "waffler"—saying
 
anything to please anybody. This third factor,
 
surprisingly, was the most damaging of all, because it
 
referred not to an activity, but to Clinton's basic
 
character. The American people might side with Clinton in
 
his explanation of the adultery and draft-dodging scandals,
 
but they would not come to support him if they believed his
 
basic character was flawed. Clinton's indecisiveness was
 
called "the character problem" by his staff and became the
 
focus for their image upgrade of Clinton.
 
On January 23, 1992, the tabloid Star broke "the
 
Gennifer Flowers story" in which she described a twelve-year
 
affair with Clinton. This was the first devastating blow to
 
the Clinton campaign, and one that would have to be dealt
 
with immediately and directly before the campaign could
 
continue with the New Hampshire primary. Clinton's staff
 
knew, of course, that the most direct and immediate route to
 
the greatest number of Americans was through television, and
 
they chose two popular television shows to try to lay the
 
Flowers rumor to rest.
 
First, Mandy Grunwald, one of Clinton's advisors, went
 
on "Nightline." Newsweek reported: "She so thoroughly
 
pinned Ted Koppel's ears back on trash-for-cash journalism
 
that even the Great Stone, Face had to admit he felt a bit
 
defensive" (Nov/Dec 1992, 33). Then, Clinton and his wife
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Hillary were offered a prime time spot on "60 Minutes" right
 
after the Super Bowl. At first, Clinton feared that his use
 
of this news show would justify the coverage of the Flowers
 
rumor by the legitimate press. But James Carville,
 
Clinton's campaign manager, argued that it would be better
 
to confront the issue immediately, rather than waiting for
 
the fall.
 
When the Clintons appeared before the cameras that
 
evening, they were well prepared and actually turned the
 
Flowers rumor around to their advantage, because not only
 
were they able to dispel the Flowers rumor in many people's
 
minds, they were also able to show the American people who
 
they were and gain newfound fame overnight. The other four
 
Democratic presidential candidates were powerless against
 
this prime time opportunity to say, "Regardless of the
 
issues in this campaign, this is who I am!"
 
Another significant factor to this television
 
appearance was the emergence of the candidate's wife as a
 
character in her own right and, although the opposition
 
viewed her as a dangerous, outspoken woman, many voters
 
across the country identified with her strength and clarity
 
and viewed her as a positive for Clinton. It is true that
 
Hillary Clinton attempted to downplay her strength as a
 
professional and capable woman in order to assuage and
 
attract the more conservative voters who were afraid of her
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forwardness. But she already had a strong following among
 
voters who were ready for a "new type" of First Lady who
 
would do more than redecorate the White House and change the
 
china pattern.
 
An interesting comparison can be made between Hillary
 
Clinton and Jacqueline Kennedy. Both were considered to be
 
a new type of potential First Lady when they made their
 
public debut, yet the novelty of each woman (Jacqueline's
 
youth and trendsetting style and Hillary's professionalism)
 
was highly restricted by the time period in which they
 
operated. Both Kennedy's and Clinton's use of their wives
 
as "Burkean props," attracted voters to them who identified
 
with the type of woman they represented.
 
The television appearance by the Clintons was a success
 
due to Hillary Clinton. According to Hohenberg, "Hillary
 
Clinton, apparently, made the difference. For by standing
 
up for her husband and defending both their marriage and the
 
future of their daughter, Mrs. Clinton helped make him [her
 
husband] a national figure" (5). In contrast to Hillary's
 
high profile, the wives of the other four candidates were
 
practically unknown.
 
But the truth of the rumored affair was still unknown.
 
Not even Clinton's staff would approach him directly about
 
it, because they secretly feared it was true since he had
 
never denied it. During the taping of the "60 Minutes"
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important was the Nixon-Kennedy debate, and I like to think
 
we helped create a president. I'd like to think we'll do it
 
again" (Newsweek Nov/Dec 1992, 34). Hewitt's use of the
 
word "create" is significant, since it shows that he
 
attributed a candidate's success to the "creation" of that
 
candidate by the television media.
 
Since the veracity of Flowers' claims was still
 
unclear, she called a press conference and offered tapes to
 
the media of alleged telephone conversations between herself
 
and Bill Clinton. Then CBS and ABC played segments without
 
verifying them. Once again, Clinton's staff used television
 
to fight back. "We're going to have to go to war,"
 
announced Clinton's campaign manager, James Carville, and he
 
went on the "Today" show the next day "to attack the
 
credibility of Flowers and the media coverage" (Newsweek.
 
Nov/Dec 1992, 34).
 
The Gennifer Flowers scandal was finally laid to rest
 
when it was discovered that the tapes had been doctored.
 
The effect of the affair upon voters was determined by an
 
ABC poll which "found that the scandal had swayed only 11
 
percent of the voters; 79 percent said the press had no
 
business poking through such dirty laundry; 82 percent
 
thought enough had been said about Clinton's personal life"
 
(Newsweek. Nov/Dec 1992, 34).
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The widespread coverage of the Flowers affair by the
 
press was indicative of an important change that occurred in
 
the thirty years between Kennedy's and Clinton's
 
presidential campaigns. As soon as Gennifer Flowers told
 
her story, journalists raced to spread this news about
 
Clinton via newspapers and television. However, even though
 
Kennedy's philandering was well-known among journalists
 
during his campaign and presidency, they did not report this
 
area of his life to the American public. Brown, in his
 
discussion of revisionist history, notes that "rumors of
 
sexual misconduct by Kennedy had been rife in Washington
 
during his lifetime" (71).
 
Even Kennedy's liaison with Inga Arvad, who accompanied
 
Hitler to the 1936 Berlin Olympic games, was left untouched
 
by the press. Parmet reports that, if Kennedy's lengthy and
 
intimate relationship with Arvad had been revealed, "it
 
could easily have reignited doubts about [Joe Kennedy, Sr.]
 
and the Nazis and, by extension. Jack and Joe McCarthy....
 
Although no evidence of her spying had actually been
 
uncovered, her close associatipns with leaders of the Third
 
Reich could have provided first-rate ammunition for Jack's
 
enemies...." (522).
 
Perhaps the journalists in the 1960s did not report
 
Kennedy's intimate activities because Kennedy enjoyed such a
 
good relationship with them, always providing them with
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Perhaps the journalists in the 1960s did not report
 
Kennedy's intimate activities because Kennedy enjoyed such a
 
good relationship with them, always providing them with
 
helpful information, granting them special favors and
 
looking out for their comfort. The lack of women reporters
 
during Kennedy's campaign might have been another reason for
 
failure to take offense at Kennedy's philandering. There
 
was also, in the early 1960s, still an overriding innocence
 
in the way citizens viewed their president, and digging into
 
a candidate's private life was considered taboo, if not
 
unnecessary. Parmet captures this national optimism when he
 
writes
 
The civil-rights movement had yet to peak,....
 
Television sets were still to show police dogs,
 
fire hoses, and cattle prods being used against
 
citizens demonstrating for the right to be
 
citizens. Cities had not begun to burn and, to
 
most Americans, Indochina was indistinguishable
 
from China, which at least everyone knew was Red.
 
When the President spoke, people listened and
 
believed, even if they weren't inspired.
 
Meanwhile, the Washington press corps happily
 
subsisted on authorized handouts and confined
 
knowledge of naughty behavior to whispers in
 
fraternal gossip sessions. Few looked for a Deep
 
Throat (522).
 
After successfully reducing the alleged Flowers affair
 
to what appeared to be an insignificant rumor, Clinton next
 
had to turn his attention to a Wall Street Journal article
 
charging him with dodging the draft during the Vietnam War.
 
ABC then exposed a letter from a 23-year-old Clinton to the
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drafted were high; then, when the lottery was instituted and
 
he drew a high number, he requested the ROTC chief to remove
 
his name from the ROTC program.
 
A heroic war record is one factor that could still be
 
considered a positive accomplishment for a candidate in the
 
thirty year span between Kennedy's and Clinton's campaign.
 
In fact, when comparing these two men, it is ironic that
 
Kennedy's connection with the military was superbly positive
 
while Clinton's was incredibly negative. Damage-control on
 
Clinton's image was clearly called for.
 
After Clinton's draft dodging became public, the
 
candidate was immediately besieged by questions about his
 
patriotism and whether or not he thought he was capable of
 
serving as commander-in-chief if elected president.
 
Clinton^s^^^ thought it best to meet the attack head-

on as they had with the Flowers affair, urging him to
 
restate his opposition to what he believed to be an
 
unjustified war. Clinton, however, attacked the press for
 
trying to tear him down and defended himself without
 
approaching the issue directly. Newsweek reported
 
The attack concealed a sharp twinge of
 
embarrassment, if not guilt; on Clinton's part>
 
He was from the Southl; he hhd grown up within its
 
tradition of military service. If ani^thlng,^^^^ ^
 
friends said, he was far more touchy over the
 
dfhft than he had ever been about Gennifer
 
Flowers. The candidate's evasiveness ;as to the
 
details of his draft record probably hurt him more
 
than not having served in Vietnam (Nov/Dec 1992,
 
34).
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friends said, he was far more touchy over the
 
draft than he had ever been about Gennifer
 
Flowers. The candidate's evasiveness as to the
 
details of his, draft record probably hurt him more
 
than not having served in Vietnam (Nov/Dec 1992,
 
34).
 
Hohenberg, who viewed Clinton's handling of the issue
 
in a more positive light, wrote
 
Clinton's response was that he had had a high
 
draft number, which was true. Moreover, when the
 
accusation was viewed against the antiwar
 
sentiment of many of the college students and
 
other youth of his generation, the draft-dodging
 
charge also failed to impress a lot of people
 
across the land (5).
 
It did not seem to affect the voters in New Hampshire
 
who gave him second place to Paul Tsongas' win there.
 
Clinton had managed to minimize the negative effects of
 
adultery and draft-dodging and was still in the race.
 
But these negative issues did stick with many voters as
 
evidence that Clinton was capable of evasiveness when clear
 
answers were called for, and that his ability to command
 
America's military was questionable.
 
Clinton's lack of directness on the draft question
 
revealed a character flaw that the voters were quick to pick
 
up on—his tendency to "waffle," to change or redefine his
 
statements to please whomever he was talking to. Newsweek
 
reports that Clinton's staffers employed modern marketing
 
techniques by assembling a focus group of ten women and
 
asking what they thought of Clinton: " 'He just goes with
 
the flow,' said one panelist. 'If you asked his favorite
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color he'd say "Plaid".' (Afterward, whenever Clinton
 
fudged, his staffers said he'd gone 'plaid.')" (Nov/Dec 40).
 
Even after the Democratic National Convention, when
 
Clinton and Gore entered the campaign trail together,
 
"Carville said they had to be careful not to look too
 
political or slick. 'Watch the"plaid" problem,' he reminded
 
them: anything that made Clinton look like he was offering
 
everything to everyone would be a disaster" (Newsweek.
 
Nov/Dec 1992, 78). " 'Specificity,' George stephanopoulos,
 
Clinton's communications director, said in New Hampshire,
 
'is a character issue this year' " (Klein 15).
 
In order to combat the character prbblem that resulte<i
 
from Clinton's perceived desire to want to please everyone,
 
his staff launched "The Manhattan Project." This program's
 
goal was to research, through focus groups, and reform
 
Clinton's image in response to various national polls. What
 
it did, in effect, was determine what the American people
 
wanted and then mold the candidate to meet that desire.
 
Clinton was, indeed, the modern presidential candidate in
 
every sense of the word. His advisors used well-known
 
marketing techniques to discover what sort of candidate was
 
wanted and then employed television to project that image to
 
the greatest number of people in the shortest amount of
 
time.
 
38
 
Marketing techniques were not used thirty years
 
previously in Kennedy's campaign because they had not yet
 
been refined. Focus groups had just come into use after
 
World War II but were not yet considered scientific enough
 
to be used successfully. Kennedy did make full use, however
 
of Lou Harris and his polling techniques. During the
 
presidential campaign, Harris would first determine who the
 
winner of a primary would be and then find out why Kennedy
 
would theoretically win or lose the race depending upon the
 
results of the survey. If Kennedy came up the loser, his
 
team would then determine why, then attempt to overcome the
 
negative factor in Kennedy's image.
 
For instance, Harris polled West Virginians in June
 
1958 and discovered that they would vote 52% for Kennedy,
 
38% for Nixon, balance undecided. In April 1960, however,
 
the poll revealed 60% for Humphrey, 40% for Kennedy. When
 
Kennedy advisors requested of pollsters an explanation for
 
the great difference in the two poll results, they were told
 
that no one knew Kennedy was Catholic in 1958. Thus,
 
Kennedy conducted most of his West Virginia campaign by
 
dealing with the issue of his religion.
 
What Clinton's advisors' research revealed was that
 
college-educated women, in particular, were suspicious of
 
Clinton and considered him no more than a mere politician.
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moving an electronic needle on a scale: 0-50 indicates
 
frigid to cool, 50-100 indicates cool to hot. Newsweek
 
reports
 
Greenberg...studied a group of 26 moderate to
 
slightly liberal white women; only six were mildly
 
impressed by Clinton. But when he said things
 
like, 'No more something for nothing," the needles
 
moved up. When he talked about keeping kids in
 
school, the needles flicked to 60. Getting w
 
welfare recipients off the rolls in two years
 
produced a 75-point spike* {Nov/Dec 42).
 
After several focus groups showed similar results, the
 
Clinton team decided to run the campaign message as a
 
simplified version of the Manhattan Project: People First,
 
with a strong dose of Responsibility.
 
As this vision expanded into reality during several
 
staff sessions, it became clear what Clinton must do.
 
Newsweek reported the results from one of the meetings
 
'We need to mention work every 15 seconds,'
 
offered Carville. Warming to the theme, Grunwald
 
said, 'by the end of the convention, what do we
 
want people to know about Clinton: that he worked
 
his way up; that his life's work had been in
 
education and investing in people; that he values
 
work; that he had moved people from welfare to
 
work; that he has a national economic strategy to
 
put America back to work.' Carville chimed in,
 
'The word "work" works for us. There are no quick
 
fixes, no hoaxes, no easy answer. We have to work
 
our way out of this mess' (Nov/Dec 42).
 
The economy was on a downward trend; people were being
 
pushed out of middle-management jobs by computers and wanted
 
work; people wanted others to work, as well, rather than
 
receive an easy welfare income from the government. And if
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Clinton had worked so hard to get himself where he was in
 
life, the voters might have surmised, then he would
 
understand their situation and help them. Clearly, this was
 
a case of word usage; that Burke would describe as a strong
 
identification factor for Clinton's constituency. They
 
identified with the message that was being put forth, and
 
they identified with the candidate. Because Clinton placed
 
his interests alongside those of his constituency, he had
 
achieved social agreement with the voters through the
 
rhetoric of "identification" as defined by Burke. When the
 
candidate is able to show the voters "that his interests and
 
attitudes and theirs are consubstantial, and that,
 
consequently, the solutions which offers are identified with
 
their interests" (Holland 38), then he has gained their
 
confidence and, possibly, their vote.
 
Besides the strong message that Clinton developed, he
 
counteracted his image as a "waffler" by employing what his
 
advisors called "counterscheduling," giving an unpopular
 
message to particular groups to prove that he was a strong,
 
independent thinker, not out to please anyone in order to
 
get votes. This technique would also assure voters that
 
Clinton could stand up for his principles, regardless of
 
what the consequences were.
 
A prime example of this counterscheduling occurred when
 
Clinton spoke to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and
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get votes. This technique would also assure voters that
 
Clinton could stand up for his principles, regardless of
 
what the consequences were.
 
A prime example of this counterscheduling occurred when
 
Clinton spoke to Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and
 
attacked Sister souljah (a rap singer) for suggesting that
 
blacks should stop killing each other and concentrate on
 
killing whites for awhile. By delivering an unpopular
 
message in person to his black audience, Clinton gathered a
 
greater number of votes from suburban whites who saw the
 
televised version of his speech in their living rooms that
 
night. It was a case of sacrificing a smaller number of
 
votes to receive a far greater number of votes. By not
 
delivering the message the Rainbow Coalition was expecting,
 
Clinton proved the worth of his character to many American
 
voters.
 
Kennedy's negatives did not spring from character
 
issues ("waffling") or activities (alleged affairs, draft
 
dodging) as Clinton's did., Rather, the negatives Kennedy
 
suffered from sprung from who he was: a rich, young,
 
inexperienced Catholic with bad health. He did not need
 
damage-control to appear capable of delivering strong
 
messages or innocent of wrongful deeds. Kennedy needed
 
damage-control to conceal or re-work what he was born with.
 
If the press of thirty years ago had reported Kennedy's
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philandering, then comparisons between the two candidate's
 
survival of bad press could be more closely aligned. What
 
is apparent though, is that both Kennedy and Clinton were
 
noteworthy in their determination and success at overcoming
 
strong negative image factors in their campaigns..
 
After Clinton won the nomination at the Democratic
 
National Convention, he began riding a wave of momentum that
 
culminated in his election as President of the United
 
States. Three factors contributed to the energy of the
 
Clinton campaign after the convention: (1) choosing Gore as
 
vice presidential running mate; (2) participating in the bus
 
tours; and (3) immediately meeting Republican challenges
 
head-on.
 
By choosing Gore as his running mate, Clinton defined
 
his campaign as a generational and regional one. Both men
 
were young and both were from the South. Morrow described
 
their combined force as follows
 
Clinton's selection of Al Gore to be his running
 
mate suggested something of the energy that might
 
be released—a sort of sibling synergy. The
 
ticket of Clinton and Gore violated traditional
 
political rules demanding geographical balance and
 
even a sort of, personality contrast between a
 
party's two nominees. The very similarity of
 
Clinton and Gore in generation and regional accent
 
produced a powerful twinning effect—policy wonks
 
in a buddy movie: Butch and Sundance (25).
 
An additional positive in a year in which "Family
 
Values" were touted by both parties as being all important,
 
was the image projected by the Gore and Clinton families.
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Hohenberg also noted the visual power of the two
 
families as follows
 
In a response to Republican concern about [family
 
values], Mrs. Gore and three of their four
 
children often took to the campaign trail with the
 
Senator and Governor Clinton. With them, usually,
 
were Hillary Clinton and the Clinton's twelve­
year-old daughter, Chelsea, making a colorful
 
showing of family values on the Democratic
 
side.... To match such a show of virility and
 
enthusiasm, the Bushes were obliged to enlist the
 
help of their grandchildren as well as the younger
 
vice president and Mrs. Quayle (65).
 
In order to counteract President Bush's well-financed
 
television campaign, the vitality of the Clinton/Gore family
 
merger was also utilized by Clinton staffers in a low-

budget, attention-grabbing ploy: the Bus Tours. Newsweek
 
caught the effect that coverage of the tours had upon the
 
public when it reported
 
The route offered 1,000 miles of getting-to-know­
you time against a backdrop of irresistible photo
 
ops: those three guys out in a field with a giant
 
Clinton-Gore banner draped across their combine,
 
that family on the front yard in lawn chairs, the
 
kids waving sparklers. At stop after stop. Gore
 
would step out and warm up the crowds. Hillary
 
and Tipper would hug like sorority sisters
 
(Nov/Dec 78).
 
At the end of the bus tours, polls showed that Clinton
 
scored higher than Bush on family values.
 
The media coverage that the Clinton team had hoped for
 
with these energetic bus tours was exuberant, prolific and
 
effective. The image presented by the combination of the
 
Clinton and Gore families sweeping America was of young.
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energetic, positive politicans ready to revamp America.
 
Kennedy presented this same image. He was young and
 
energetic, and momentum was built for his campaign by the
 
support of his many family members giving speeches and teas
 
within any geographic area he was visiting.
 
But, in order to sustain the positive wave of energy
 
generated by the bus tours, the Clinton campaign needed a
 
solid foundation. "Momentum is not message," announced
 
Clinton's analyst Grunwald (Newsweek. Nov/Dec 79). And this
 
is when James Carville organized what he called the "War
 
Room." Its main focus was to keep tabs on Bush, media
 
reports, and inside rumors to determine any forthcoming
 
attacks on Clinton and to be ready with an immediate
 
counterattack. Hohenberg described the results when he
 
wrote
 
Once the White House assault began on [Clinton's]
 
character, he slammed back sometimes with two
 
blows for one. The governor and his hard-working
 
staff had perfected a system of prompt responses
 
to anything that came out of Republic headquarters
 
or the White House. If the president called
 
Clinton 'weak-kneed,' a 'knpw-nothing' and 'not to
 
be trusted,' the name-calling also mounted on the
 
Democratic side that the president was
 
'irresponsible,' 'pitiful,' and 'afraid to debate
 
the issues' (122).
 
It was an effective tactic, and further strengthened
 
Clinton's image as man who could deal effectively with any
 
problem that came his way. The immediate responses also had
 
a negative effect upon the opposition, making the
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Republicans look desperate and ineffectual in their attacks
 
upon Clinton.
 
Once Kennedy and Clinton had proved to the voters that
 
they were energetic, trustworthy, and capable of leading the
 
nation, they chose to project and prove this image through
 
national televised debates with their opponents. It was in
 
these debates that the American people would be given a
 
chance to scrutinize their chosen candidate in a way that
 
was not allowed by any of the news reports or televised
 
sound bites they had been exposed to thus far.
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A Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of a Televised
 
Presidential Debate from 1960 and 1992
 
Clinton and Kennedy created an image of themselves by-

assessing the voters' expectations of what was needed in a
 
candidate, then minimizing their negatives and accentuating
 
their positives to meet that need. By understanding what
 
voters expected, then using images, words and props to
 
create an image with which the voters could identify,
 
Clinton and Kennedy held an advantage over their opponents
 
which led to their election. One of the most important
 
means for Clinton and Kennedy to project their created image
 
to the public was through the televised presidential
 
debates. Clearly, the candidate who understood the medium
 
best would have an advantage over his opponents.
 
Since the first Kennedy-Nixon debate in 1950 had proven
 
so convincingly the power of image over substance, much
 
analysis and study had gone into the effect of television on
 
viewers. Thus, Clinton, Bush and Perot had the advantage of
 
thirty-two years of television experience with which to
 
project their image to millions of voters. Yet Clinton
 
seemed to have the advantage over his opponents in the
 
second presidential debate, perhaps because he had chosen an
 
innovative format which he felt more comfortable with than
 
the other two candidates.
 
The second presidential debate of 1992 occurred the
 
evening of October 15th at the University of Richmond in
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Richmond, Virginia. The Republican incumbent. President
 
George Bush, was present along with the Democratic candidate
 
Bill Glinton and independent candidate Ross Perot. Although
 
Ross Perot charmed viewers with his homespun "folksy" wisdom
 
and delighted reporters with his talent for spouting
 
humorous one-liners that could be repeated in the evening
 
hewsr he cduld not be considered a serious threat to either
 
Clinton or Bush, each of whose main concern was obviously
 
with the other. He was, however a wild card who could do
 
damage if his sudden rise in popularity were not properly
 
understood. U.S. News & World Report described the role
 
Perot played, thus: "His folksy directness only reinforced
 
the sense that Clinton and Bush were sidestepping difficult
 
issues and that politics as usual would not do" (Oct. 26,
 
1992, 43).
 
Therefore, Clinton and Bush treated Mr. Perot
 
deferentially throughout the debate, attempting to align
 
themselves with him as a friend rather than a foe. On one
 
occasion during the second debate. Bush said, "Like.Mr.
 
Perot, I...." In another instance, Clinton stated, "...I
 
think Mr. Perot and I agree on this...." Obviously, neither
 
Clinton nor Bush wanted to alienate Perot's supporters,
 
hoping to garner support from, them if Perot dropped out of
 
the race again.
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Bill Clinton's main concern in this second debate>
 
in the other 1992 presidential debates, was to persuade
 
voters that he was the obvious choice to be elected
 
president in the upcoming elections. In order to do this,
 
he had to maintain and strengthen the image he had created
 
during his campaign by proving that his knowledge on
 
important issues dembristtated his competence to lead,
 
despite the fact that he was in his early forties and had
 
only been involved in politics at the state level.
 
Clinton also had to convince voters that he was
 
trustworthy by coming out with strong, definitive statements
 
on the issues, thereby further dispelling his negative image
 
as a "waffler." The strong, fact-based statements that
 
Clinton put forth in the debate also added to his competency
 
factor. Additionally, he would continue to carry the
 
campaign theme "People First" into the debate arena by
 
encouraging individual responsibility, but also by showing
 
that ordinary people count. Clinton obviously wanted to
 
give the impression, during the debates, that the concerns
 
and opinions of every voter were important to him and would
 
continue to be so if he were elected president.
 
Clinton understood the public's growing dissatisfaction
 
with the excesses of Congress. Self-importance was held in
 
low regard by voters in the fall of 1992. It explained, in
 
part, Perot's rapid gain in popularity, since he portrayed
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liimself as an outsiijer who W'as going to go to washlngtoh to
 
"fix it." It also partly explained Reagan's popularity when
 
he was president. As Jamiesoh explains it: "Where Nixon
 
spoke as The President and Johnson as Your President, Reagan
 
[spoke] as a neighbor who steppsd out of a shower one
 
eyening to find that he had been asked to lead the country
 
for a while" (Eloquence 158).
 
Because the 1992 voters Were increasingly distrustful
 
of "Washington insidersy" feelihg they were out of touch the
 
needs of working Americans, the ability to distance one's
 
self from Washington, while seeking the nation's highest
 
office there, became a distinct assets Therefore, Clinton
 
proposed a "talk show" style format for the second debate in
 
which the au^iepce members would ]^ose questions to the
 
candidates, thus giving the impression that he believed
 
ordinary citizens were ihtelligent enough to ask questions
 
of future presidents. The stage props were also less formal
 
(bar stpofs with small ta^ next to them to hold notes and
 
glasses of water) thahthe Previously used podiums.
 
Carole Simpson, an ABC reporter who moderated this
 
debate, mentioned in her introduction that Bill Clinton had
 
proposed the format and Clinton himself reiterated this fact
 
later in the debate in his answer to a questioner who
 
wondered why the candidates couldn't stop "trashing each
 
othef" and just try to find the ba for the
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issues. Clinton responded: "...I believe so strongly in
 
the question you asked," he said, "that I suggested this
 
format tonight. I started doing these formats a year ago in
 
New Hampshire, and I found that we had huge crowds because
 
all I did was let people ask questions and I tried to give
 
very specific answers" (Reuter 16:17).
 
In this answer, Clinton not only stressed the
 
importance that the opinions of "real people" have for him,
 
but he also stressed the significance of his involvement in
 
bringing about this revolutionary format, thus insinuating
 
that Bush and Perot had not actively sought the opinions of
 
ordinary people or been innovative enough to suggest such a
 
format themselves. This indictment of his competitors made
 
them appear guilty by omission.
 
It is obvious that Clinton chose a debate format in
 
which he excelled and which he probably realized would cause
 
Bush to falter. Perhaps the genius of Clinton's choice of
 
this format was displayed when a young black woman asked the
 
candidates how the national debt had affected them
 
personally. William F. Buckley, Jr. reported, "...a whole
 
lot of time was spent trying to cope with the question in
 
such a way as not to hurt the feelings of the questioner,
 
and so appear to be brusque and unfeeling" (70).
 
More than any other question in the second debate, this
 
one appeared to cause Bush's worst moment and Clinton's
 
51
 
best. Mr. Perot volunteered to answer the question first
 
and did an adequate job of taking the questioner's feelings
 
iiitg account while stating that the debt had caused him to
 
enter the presidential race.
 
called upon by Carole Simpson to give
 
his answer, but she interrupted him four times before he had
 
said two sentences, clarifying that he must describe his own
 
persohal expebien^ "You personally," she kept repeating
 
to Bush, Finally,^ B obviously floundering, uttered what
 
had to be the most damaging sound bite of the campaign:
 
''I'm not sure I get...help me with the question and I'll try
 
to answer it" (Reuter 16:30).
 
This statement caused the Clinton team to immediately
 
race around their command post forging that moment into a
 
damaging indictment of Bush. Their method of attack is
 
described by Rosenstiel
 
It was irrelevant that the woman confronting
 
Bush had probably meant to ask how the recession
 
had affected Bush rather than the national debt,
 
and that her imprecision, not the economy, was
 
what had stumped the less-than-nimble President.
 
What mattered was the black outline of
 
recollection: A citizen asked Bush about the
 
economy and he didn't understand the question.
 
The moment reinforced exactly what was driving the
 
election—that Bush was out of step. If Clinton's
 
team could get the press to repeat their talking
 
point, and replay the video of that moment over
 
and over in the days after this October 15 debate,
 
they would define what this moment came to mean
 
and trap Bush with his own words.
 
Within minutes Clinton campaign headquarters in
 
Little Rock had written up the "Talking Points"
 
and faxed them to both the group in Virginia and
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the fifty state offices to use. The document
 
began, " 'I'm not sure I get it,' said Bush"
 
(304).
 
Not only was Bush portrayed as "not getting" the
 
economy in answering this question, he also portrayed
 
himself as one who does not "get" the troubles of the
 
ordinary American, which would be severely damaging to how
 
voters perceived him. U.S. News and World Report, in
 
forecasting what sort of difficulties might occur during the
 
second debate, reported
 
"When you have a sincere person asking a weird,
 
off-the-wall question," says a prominent political
 
consultant, "your candidate tends to give a weird,
 
off-the-wall reply." And viewers have a natural
 
sympathy for citizen questioners—who are seen as
 
more in tune with everyday concerns (Oct. 19,
 
1992, 11).
 
Yet Clinton's response to this questioner was
 
undoubtably one of his best moments during this debate and
 
gave viewers the impression that he was deeply concerned for
 
the ordinary citizen, verifying the "People First" theme of
 
his campaign. He had prepared himself well for this sort qf
 
situation before the debate. Carville had advised Clinton
 
to "'...use the audience—make the audience your friend.'
 
....'Tone and body language are important,' Clinton said as
 
he calculated the best fighting stance to take against Bush"
 
(Newsweek. Nov/Dec 1992, 91).
 
The Newsweek article goes on to describe Clinton's
 
response to the woman:
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Body language well prepared, Clinton moved in
 
toward the young woman, established eye contact
 
and talked warmly about how much pain the national
 
debt caused in^^^va small state like Arkansas, where
 
the governor personally knew people who lost their
 
jobs when companies went bankrupt. Clinton
 
connected" (91).
 
Clinton first of all questioned the woman in a
 
concerned tone, "Tell me how it's affected you again."
 
"Um..." the woman replied. "You know people who've lost
 
their jobs and lost their homes?" he asked. "Well, yeah,
 
uh*^huh,'' she said/ He explained that because his state
 
is so small, "when people lose their jobs, there'safgood
 
chance by their names." Clinton also said
 
that during the last thirteen months of his campaign, he had
 
met many people "like you" all over America who had lost
 
their jobs (Reuter 16:30).
 
It is ironic that, although superficially, Clinton's
 
answer showed that he was leSs personally affected by the
 
poor economy than the other two candidates, it seemed that
 
he w^ the most affected because he cared more for others'
 
who were affected by it. Perot's family had suffered
 
because he decided to run for President to fix the economy;
 
Bush had heard of and talked to those who lost their jobs
 
and money had come out of his own pocket because
 
"everything's more expensive;" Clinton knew people by name
 
who had lost their jobs. Yet what the American people saw
 
on television (and could not see by listening to the radio)
 
was a presidential candidate who was extremely concerned for
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this one woman who was worried about the economy. Viewers
 
could easily infer, from seeing Clinton's concern for this
 
woman, that he would carry this understanding of the economy
 
and concern for its victims into the White House and turn
 
things around.
 
This sort of concern for a troubled fellow human being
 
carries such strong emotional weight, that it could also
 
dispel any uncertainties voters might have about Clinton's
 
alleged immorality (the Flowers' affair), unpatriotic
 
attitude (dodging the draft and alleged participation in
 
anti-American demonstrations in Russia), or character
 
problems (there was certainly no waffling in his feelings of
 
concerh for this woman), in this particular instance, body
 
language (walking toward the woman, establishing eye
 
contact, talking directly to her) and the display of concern
 
overrode the content of Clinton^s answer.
 
It is clear that Clinton's strongest attribute in this
 
debate was his demonstration of concern for "ordinary
 
people." clearly, this sort of empathy with the problems of
 
voters would increase his likability factor. But Clinton
 
also had to prove to voters that he was competent to lead
 
the country. To do this he would have to overcome possible
 
concerns that he was too young and inexperienced and show
 
that he understood the national and international concerns
 
of the U.S. Three characteristics of Clinton's speech style
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aritJ choice of words would bolster voters' confidence in his
 
abilities: numbering, leadership statements, profusion of
 
the first person pronoun "I."
 
Numbering has long been used by speakers to hold an
 
audience's attention and provide a comforting sense of
 
completion to the speaker's statement. Max Atkinson adds
 
that such numbering, "...can work to strengthen, underline
 
or amplify almost any kind of message" (60). It is not
 
surprising, therefore, that out of the twelve answers
 
Clinton provided during the second debate, half of them
 
(six) included numbering and, of those six, four of the
 
answers contained three numbered items, which is the most
 
potent and satisfying form of numbering for the listener.
 
The other two answers contained two and four numbered items.
 
Neither Bush nor Perot included numbering in their
 
answers during the second debate, prefering a more informal
 
method for proposing solutions to problems. This tactic
 
benefitted Perot because it furthered his "folksy" image.
 
Numbering would have made him appear more prepared than
 
"just a businessman" should be. Bush, as the incumbent,
 
strengthened his leadership image by confidently explaining
 
problems and calling upon his experience in office as proof
 
of his understanding of the situations presented. If Bush
 
had used numbering, it could have worked against him, making
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it appear as though he were coming up with new solutions to
 
problems he should already have solved.
 
Clinton's numbering, however, in contrast to the
 
relaxed attitude of the other two candidates, made him
 
appear knowledgeable on the issues and ready to put a
 
specific plan in place once he were in Washington in order
 
to make the lives of all American citizens far better.
 
Further, Clinton's numbering of steps in planned solutions,
 
in contrast to Bush's listing of what had already occurred,
 
gave viewers the impression that, whatever Bush had done, it
 
hadn't worked and some new plan must be put into effect.
 
Television viewers had the added visual benefit (over
 
radio listeners) of seeing Clinton number each proposed step
 
with his fingers. The movement of Clinton's hand in unison
 
with his words further strengthened each numbered statement
 
that he made.
 
An additional factor in Clinton's phrasing which
 
strengthened his imaga as a capable leader was his profusion
 
of leadership statements, Bennet notes that "appeals to
 
popular leadership images are an important part of the
 
pragmatics of any campaign." He explains the importance of
 
leadership statements when he writes
 
If elections are about nothing else, they
 
entail the dramatization and resolution of
 
collective concerns about security, governmental
 
succession, and the shape of the future. In order
 
for candidates to play their roles properly, they
 
must address these concerns by symbolizing
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leadership as the basic campaign issue and by
 
transmitting familiar images of leadership in the
 
process (226).
 
in other words, voters who are about to experience a change
 
of leadership want to be reassured that they are secure in
 
the hope that their lifestyle will remain relatively intact
 
if not improved by the candidate they elect. Thus, it is
 
the candidate's primary concern to consistently reassure
 
voters in the form of leadership statements. If a candidate
 
is able to project an image of strong leadership, then
 
vdters that this leader will not waiver in
 
times of crisis.
 
Clinton strengthened his leadership image for the
 
voters in two ways. First, he made continual reference to
 
his position and experience as Governor of Arkansas for
 
twelve years and, in so doing, reminded voters that he had
 
been a leader for many years. This is in keeping with
 
Bennet's theory that projecting leadership imagery to voters
 
gains support for a candidate:
 
A common pragmatic symbolization of leadership
 
is the practice of incumbents to blur the
 
distinction between their image as a candidate and
 
their image as public official.... Candidates who
 
lack this symbolic resource (incumbency) must
 
develop other devices if they are to convert their
 
obligatory attention to leadership into a
 
pragmatic consideration as well. ...short of
 
being president, the next best strategy for a
 
candidate is to create situations in which he can
 
appear to act in a presidential manner (228-229).
 
Clinton began this leadership association for the
 
audience in his first response during the debate, indicating
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that his desire to promote his governing experience was
 
foremost in importance for him. in fact, Clinton's self-

promotion was so prominent in his agenda, it seems, that the
 
leadership statement was interjected somewhat out of
 
into the response, resulting in an illogical presentation of
 
his thoughts.
 
Clinton's first words in the debate were: "I'd like to
 
answer the question, because I've actually been a governor
 
for twelve years, so I've known a lot of people who have
 
lost their jobs because of jobs moving overseas, and I know
 
a lot of people whose plants have been strengthened by
 
increasing exports" (Renter 16:15).
 
Upon hearing this response, the audience might have
 
initially assumed that Clinton was saying he'd like to
 
answer the question because he'd "actually been a governor
 
for twelve years," rather than what he really meant to
 
imply, which was that because he'd been a governor for
 
twelve years, he'd gleaned some experience relevant to
 
answering the question. The word "actually" in Clinton's
 
response reveals an embarrassingly puerile attempt at self-

promotion. The use of this word worked against him because
 
it sounds childish, and it displayed a subconscious reactive
 
defense against the opinion of voters who believed him too
 
young and inexperienced to be president, thus validating
 
those opinions.
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After this awkward start, Clinton referred to his
 
governorship five more times during the debate, including
 
his closing statement. These references, included within
 
his responses, were: "I've worked on these things for
 
twelve years...." (Renter 16:17); "I've been governor of a
 
small state for twelve years,...." (Renter 16:30); "...I've
 
spent more of my time and life on this in the last twelve
 
years than any other issue" (Renter 16:33); "...the people
 
of my state have let me be their governor for twelve years
 
because..." (Renter 16:35); "...my state ranks first in the
 
country in job growth,..." (Renter 16:35).
 
Along with these references to his governorship,
 
Clinton attempted to strengthen his leadership image with a
 
profusibn of the first-person singular pronoun "I" scattered
 
throughout his speech. When viewed in comparison to the
 
speech of the other two candidates in the debate, the
 
abundance of Clinton's "I" statements is noteworthy.
 
Although "I" statements did appear in Bush's and Perot's
 
speech. Bush's responses included more statements of fact
 
("There are... "This is...") which reflected his knowledge
 
of specific issues, yet removed him personally from his
 
statements. Perot's responses utilized the second-person
 
(''You've got to...") as he outlined what must be done to fix
 
pfoblems in the government, although it could be assumed by
 
the audience that Perot himself would be the active ageht in
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active agent in his proposed solutions. The use of the
 
second person sounds less harsh and more informal than
 
consistently saying, "I am going to..." throughout the
 
debate.
 
Brennan and Hahn state: "That the frequency of the
 
first-person singular [pronoun] is related to egocentrism is
 
neither a new nor discerning notion,..." {51). certainly,
 
the constant use of "I" draws attention to the speaker.
 
This is exactly what Clinton hoped for. His responses are
 
filled with combinations of "i think," "i believe," "i
 
want," "I asked," "I suggested," "I found," "I saw." Yet,
 
rather than assume the more superficial motivation of
 
egocentrism behind this sort of word choice, it might be
 
suggested that Clinton is using the "i" pronoun in his
 
speech to indicate his personal ownership of and investment
 
in his statements, thus promoting his leadership
 
capabilities.
 
When Clinton says, "i think," or "i believe," it
 
appears that he wants to make it clear to the audience that
 
these opinions are his own, carefully examined and arrived
 
at after much study, rather than facts he obtained from an
 
analyst or almanac. When he employs such statements as, "I
 
asked," "i suggested," "i found," he is indicating to the
 
audience that he personally took action to solve the problem
 
under discussion.
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Brennan and Hahn offer another explanation for a
 
speaker's use of "I think," when they write: "As the subject
 
becomes more aware of personal fallibility, direct
 
statements are replaced by more cautious indirections, such
 
as 'it seems that,' 'it may be,' and 'I think that,' with
 
each expression followed by a noun clause. In their
 
extreme, these indirections become vacillations" (51). Yet,
 
this does not seem to be the case with Clinton's speech. As
 
stated above, he is attempting to show the voters his
 
personal investment in his facts and opinions. The
 
alternative phrasing would have been "I know," which is far
 
tbo strong, sounding somewhat overbearing and not commonly
 
used in this situation, or direct statements of fact, such
 
as Bush used, which would not indicate a personal investment
 
in the ensuing phrase.
 
All of the factors explored above: Use of the "I"
 
pronoun, references to governorship, people first, and
 
distancing from Washington, came together in one particular
 
response Clinton gave during the debate, when he defended
 
himself against Perot's innuendo that Bush and Clinton let
 
others do their thinking for them. Perot stated: "Now, just
 
for the record, I don't have any spin doctors. I don't have
 
any speechwriters. Probably shows. I make those charts you
 
see on television. But you don't have to wonder if it's me
 
talking. See, what you see is what you get, and if you
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don't like it, you got two other choices, right?" (Reuter
 
16:17)
 
Clinton interrupted Perot's response, saying
 
Wait a minute. I want to say just one thing
 
now, Ross, in fairness. The ideas I express are
 
mine. I've worked on these things for twelve
 
years and I'm the only person up here who hasn't
 
been part of Washington in any way for the last
 
twenty years. So I don't want the implication to
 
be that somehow everything we say is just cooked
 
up and put in our head by somebody else. I worked
 
twelve years very hard as a governor on the real
 
problems of real people. I'm just as sick as you
 
are by having to wake up and figure out how to
 
defend myself every day. I never thought I'd ever
 
be involved in anything like this (Reuter 16:17).
 
In this statement, Clinton reveals how important it is to
 
him to have voters know how hard he has worked on coming to
 
his own conclusions about various issues. His personal
 
investment in the process, indicated by the "I" pronoun, is
 
abundantly obvious. He distances himself from Washington,
 
thus villainizing Perot and Bush in the audience's mind. He
 
makes two distinct references to his experience as governor,
 
using the magic number "twelve." And he talks about "real"
 
problems and "real" people, again villainizing Bush and
 
Perot by suggesting that they have spent too much time "at
 
the top" to have any experience with actual human beings and
 
must have arrived at their opinions some other way.
 
This sort of defensive response by a non-incumbent is
 
usually directed at incumbents. But Bush and Clinton had
 
been admonished earlier by two questioners to quit "mud­
63
 
slinging" and just stick to solving the issues. So Clinton
 
interjected his image-promoting defense at the most
 
appropriate time. If he had interrupted Bush with this sort
 
of utterance, he might have invited a stronger response from
 
Bush than Perot's simple, "May I finish?" and been viewed as
 
ignoring the requests of the "real" people to stop such
 
bickering.
 
Additionally, Clinton's use of Perot's first name,
 
"Ross," created a friendly and informal tone, because
 
friends call each other by first name. This friendly
 
informality is in stark contrast to the very formal tone of
 
the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debate in which Nixon referred to his
 
opponent as "Senator Kennedy," and Kennedy responded with
 
"Mr. Nixon" or "the vice president."
 
Clinton faced a dichotomy in his efforts to distance
 
himself from Washington and big government while, at the
 
same time, proving that his experience as Arkansas' governor
 
qualified him to run the country. This predicament was
 
easily resolv^^ however, by not including both
 
qualifications in the same statement and by responding with
 
the appropriate aspect depending upon the question. When an
 
audience member posed a question calling for a propbSed
 
solution to a specific problem, Clinton would inflate his
 
experience as governor to cover such issues as national
 
health care and a balanced economy. But when the questioner
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exhibited some vulnerability or asked for the candidate's
 
personal experience, such as the ydung black woman mentioned
 
above, Clinton reduced his governpiship of Arkahsae
 
equivalent of running a town meeting.
 
He began his response to her b "Tell me how
 
it's affected you again. You know peopie who've lost their
 
jobs and lost their homes?" She responded affirmatively and
 
then Clinton attempted to align himself with the woman's
 
experience, saying, "Well, I'ye been governor Of a small
 
state for twelve years. I'11 tell you how it's affected me.
 
Every year congress and the president sign laws that make us
 
do more things and gives us less money to do it with"
 
(Reuter 16:30). Then he continued to relate to the woman
 
what the federal government had done to the people of his
 
state.
 
Clinton^s use of the word "small" in tbe response hp
 
the woman is significant. It distanced him from Washington
 
and identified him With all the other "small" citizens who
 
were, supposedly, too insignificant to be of concern to the
 
federal government. His use of the third-person plural "us"
 
also forged this alliance between Clinton and those who had
 
suffered at the hands of the federal government.
 
By limiting or expanding his governing experience,
 
depehding upon what type of reisponso wa^^ required, and by
 
focusing upon only one aspect of that experience per each
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response, Clinton was able to accomplish the difficult
 
rhetorical feat of projecting both images to the debate
 
audience; his domain was small enough that he could
 
experience each person's pain personally, yet large enough
 
to provide him with the expertise to govern a nation.
 
In addition to Clinton's word choices, another
 
important element to be examined in this debate was his
 
propensity to wait rather than volunteer to answer a
 
question. Out of the twelve questions asked, Clinton only
 
volunteered to answer once, and even with this one instance,
 
he was not volunteering to respond first, but to answer
 
second. Clinton gave the first response only three times,
 
only because the question was directed at him. Of the three
 
times he responded second, he was directed to answer by the
 
moderator twice. Clinton was the last to respond six times.
 
Perot, like Clinton, responded first three times, second
 
three times, and last six times, yet he volunteered three
 
times. Most significantly. Bush aggressively volunteered to
 
respond five times and never responded last. He responded
 
first six times and second six times. The moderator, Carole
 
Simpson, did not seem to employ any order in her direction
 
of questions to the candidates. In fact, once when she
 
called on Clinton to answer second, he declined, saying,
 
"Ross has his hand up" (Reuter 16:17).
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This information can be interpreted two ways. If a
 
viewer had perceived Clinton as a waffler before the debate,
 
his lack of volunteering might justify such an opinion. It
 
might be assumed that he needed time to think over a proper
 
response and wanted to hear what the other two candidates
 
had to say first. Perhaps he knew he could come up with a
 
more palatable response after judging the responses of Bush
 
and Perot and capitalizing on their errors or inadequacies.
 
If a viewer were pro-Clinton, the candidate's
 
responding last could be viewed as a sign of patience and
 
deference to others. The Clinton supporter might believe
 
that Clinton was allowing the other two candidates to go
 
first because he was being polite, rather than buying time
 
to come up with an answer. The assumption could also be
 
made that Clinton was shrewd enough to realize the
 
rhetorical advantage to speaking last.
 
Certainly, it was to Clinton's advantage to answer
 
last. After having a chance to hear the responses of the
 
other two candidates and having more time to form his
 
response, Clinton would be at an advantage. Also, the last
 
response to a question would probably be the one most likely
 
to be remembered by the audience, further strengthening
 
Clinton's position.
 
Clinton successfully promoted himself in the second
 
televised presidential debate of 1992 by continually
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reminding the voters of his leadership position (as Governor
 
of Arkansas), distancing himself from Washington, appearing
 
sympathetic to questioners, and including strong, factual
 
statements in his responses.
 
Thirty-two years previously, John F. Kennedy certainly
 
realized in advance what opportunities a nationally
 
televised presidential debate would provide him. However,
 
what Kennedy considered to be an opportunity in a television
 
appearance, namely the further projection and strengthening
 
of his image before millions of voters, was probably
 
different from Nixon's idea of opportunity. Before the
 
first debate, Nixon only seemed eager for the opportunity to
 
present his ideas to the voters, not his image.
 
Kennedy's success in the debates would be threefold:
 
he would receive national recognition and become as well-

known as vice President Nixon; he would overcome the voters'
 
negative perception of him as too young and inexperienced as
 
he proved his knowledge of the issues; and, with his
 
knowledge of how to manipulate the technicalities of visual
 
effects during the debates, he would project a stronger,
 
more likeable image than Nixon. Minow and Sloan confirm
 
Kennedy's understanding of the television medium and its
 
advantages for him whey they write: "Senator Kennedy was
 
comfortable with television and confident that he could use
 
it to his advantage" (10).
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 Certainly, Kennedy achieved nation-wide recognitidn
 
with these televised debates and convinced many more voters '
 
that he was capable of serving asl President^ Berry writes
 
...Kennedy, the lesser known candidate, gained
 
prominence by receiving prime time TV cpverage
 
with vice Presideht Richard Nixohv ...th^ general
 
consensus of opinion was that KehnedYpvercame the
 
publicVs perceived image of him as too immature
 
and too inexperienced to lead the free world" (34­
35).
 
Berry explains that Kennedy accomplished this image reversal
 
"by demonstrating his broad awareness of all the issues and
 
by quickly citing pertinent facts and statistics to support
 
his statements" (35). Kennedy also established his
 
authority by challenging Nixon's many statements about the
 
Republican record and countering with his own proposals.
 
Yet, even though Kennedy and Nixon countered each
 
others proposals for a better nation, the candidates'
 
appearance had a greater effect upon viewers than did their
 
words. It was the first major triumph of image over issues
 
in the television medium. Reeves' analysis of the debate
 
summarizes the effect it had upon viewers
 
Despite their lack of intellectual substance, the
 
debates stirred public interest in the election
 
and clearly helped Kennedy's campaign.... Jack
 
became better known to the nation and impressed
 
millions with his ability to stand toe--to-toe with
 
the more famous viGe-president. His emerg^^
 
^	 gharisma-^ from a blend of good looks, a
 
forceful speaking manner, and a seeming abundance
 
bf sblf-confidence, charm, and sihcerity--was no
 
doubt an even more powerful influence" (200-201).
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Clearly, the words that were spoken in that first debate
 
were not as powerful as the positive, confident image of
 
Kennedy that was transmitted to millions of television
 
viewers that night.
 
Kennedy had already glossed over his very serious
 
health problems through his denial of them and by exuding an
 
aura of vitality in all of his photographs and appearances.
 
He had also successfully minimized the negative effects of
 
his Catholic religion in his "Houston Ministers' Speech."
 
Therefore, the principle negative factor that he would be
 
attempting to change in the debates was the charge that he
 
was too young and inexperienced to govern the country.
 
During the four "Great Debates" between Kennedy and
 
Nixon, it became obvious that the two candidates had no
 
disparate views on the goals for America, only on the means
 
to achieve those goals. With disagreement thus minimized,
 
the debates were reduced to a battle of images. Nowhere was
 
this more apparent than in the first debate on September 26,
 
1960 in Chicago. It is estimated that seventy-five million
 
people watched the two candidates on television that night,
 
and many based their opinion of the candidates upon what
 
they saw, not what they heard. As testimony to television's
 
visual power, those who watched the first debate on
 
television thought Kennedy was the winner; those who
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listened to the debate on radio thought Nixon was the
 
winner.
 
The reason television viewers gave the debate to
 
Kennedy has been well documented and is encapsulated by
 
Jamieson in Presidential Debates
 
In the first presidential debate of 1960,
 
Nixon--pale from a hospital stay and perspiring
 
under the hot studio lights—evinced cues that
 
can, but do not necessarily, signal stress. By
 
giving him a sinister look, the beard apparent
 
under his poorly made-up translucent skin
 
complicated matters further. Nixon glanced
 
repeatedly at a clock just off stage. In a
 
bearded, pale, perspiring candidate, this invited
 
the inappropriate inference that Nixon was shifty-

eyed. Additionally, the freshly painted set had
 
dried to a color lighter than that anticipated by
 
Nixon's consultants. Consequently the gray suit
 
he wore blended into the background, blurring his
 
image. Finally, an injury to his knee as he
 
alighted his limousing caused him pain.
 
By shifting weight from that knee to the podium he
 
minimized the pain, but at high cost. During his
 
hospital stay, he had lost weight. His suit, as a
 
result, was a bit large for him. As he leaned on
 
the podium for support, the suit shifted forward
 
on one shoulder, suggesting that he had, perhaps,
 
purchased it second hand or borrowed it from a
 
friend. In a fitted blue suit, his face
 
suntanned, Kennedy looked more decisive than his
 
pale, ill-suited eye-shifting opponent.... Dogged
 
by the charge that he was too inexperienced to
 
lead the nation, Kennedy looked resolute. At one
 
point he caught a glimpse of himself on the studio
 
monitor and reacted by assuming a determined
 
expression. As Nixon spoke, Kennedy took notes as
 
if in anticipation of rebuttal. To minimize his
 
youthful look, Kennedy trimmed his bushy hair"
 
(183-184).
 
In the 1992 televised presidential debates, the visual
 
contrast between candidates was not as stark as this first
 
debate between Kennedy and Nixon because all three
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candidates, armed with the knowledge gained from past
 
televised debates, realized that image was of first
 
importance. It might be said that Nixon had no such
 
knowledge in this first debate and was caught completely
 
unaware of the power of television's projection of images to
 
the viewers.
 
In combination with Kennedy's vigorous appearance in
 
comparison to Nixon's sweaty, shifty, dour one, Kennedy's
 
rhetorical style supported the image of a candidate
 
energetic, determined, and knowledgeable enough to lead the
 
nation. Barber quotes James McGregor Burns as saying of
 
Kennedy during his campaign, "He slowly developed a style of
 
direct, informal, simple speaking, without high-blown
 
rhetoric or bombastic exaggeration, that to some of his
 
listeners was in happy contrast to the oratory of the old-

fashioned politicians" (357).
 
During the first debate, Kennedy's rhetorical style
 
played out in several ways. The significance of some
 
elements of Kennedy's rhetoric were highlighted by Nixon's
 
ineptness in understanding the television medium. For
 
instance, Nixon entered the first debate believing that it
 
would be, in fact, a debate. But, as Rubin points out,
 
"...the word 'debate' was stretched that night on several
 
counts. As debaters, the candidates would have done better
 
alone" (55).
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Jamieson explains what happened that night and why
 
Nixon's misunderstanding of television's style put Kennedy
 
in the forefront:
 
By viewing it as a 'debate,' Nixon 'lost' the
 
first Kennedy-Nixon joint appearance. His varsity
 
debate instincts at the ready, the vice president
 
marshalled his facts against Kennedy's, contested
 
points, and defended his ground. He instead
 
should have showcased himself against the backdrop
 
Kennedy provided. By combatting Kennedy's
 
arguments, Nixon legitimized the less experienced
 
senator and ignored an opportunity to appear
 
presidential (Eloquence. 50).
 
Atkinson asserts that television calls for a different
 
style of projection. He writes: "...to rely on techniques
 
of oratory in a studio interview of discussion is to run the
 
risk of coming across as long-winded, tense and generally
 
lacking in spontaneity" ((176). These adjectives were
 
ascribed to Nixon's style in the first debate, lending
 
further credibility to the fact that Nixonhad a limited
 
understanding of how to best conduct himself on television
 
to receive a positive viewer reaction.
 
The inherent problems of televised debates—choices to
 
be made and the implications of those choices—are also
 
explained by Jamieson when she writes about the pressures
 
placed upon the candidates
 
They are expected, for example, to both engage
 
each other and speak to the mass audience. As
 
every presidential debate has demonstrated, it is
 
difficult to do both. Nixon chose to engage
 
Kennedy in their first debate, repeatedly
 
summarizing Kennedy's points and addressing his
 
arguments. In the process, he lost the
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opportunities Kennedy seized to play to the folks
 
at home. By so doing, the vice president won as a
 
debater and lost as would-be president
 
(Presidential Debates. 165).
 
"Play to the folks at home," is exactly what Kennedy
 
excelled at in this first debate. While Nixon dutifully
 
combatted Kennedy's statements point-by-point, Kennedy,
 
according to White, "used each question as a springboard for
 
an appeal to the mind and the imagination of the audience
 
assembled before the countless sets" (288).
 
Nixon also made the mistake of continually referring to
 
Kennedy by name during the debate. "Senator Kennedy" was so
 
prevalent in Nixon's responses that the audience was
 
continually reminded of him, even when he wasn't speaking.
 
Conversely, Kennedy mentioned his opponent only when
 
necessary in his responses and then referred to him only as
 
"Mr. Nixon" or "the vice president"—never "Vice President
 
Nixon." In this way, Kennedy diminished the image of Nixon
 
as vice president and kept him in the background as much as
 
possible when giving his responses. By the end of the
 
evening, it might be assumed by some voters that Kennedy was
 
leading the way with his own innovative and effective plan
 
for getting America moving again while Nixon's policies were
 
formed by pointing out what was wrong with Kennedy's plan.
 
Kennedy also effectively spelled out the similarities
 
in his and Nixon's governmental experience, thus favorably
 
cancelling any remaining concerns in voters' minds that he
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was;not experlerieed enough to lead the country, In fact,
 
the first question posed to Kehnedy in the debate concerned
 
Nixon's charges that he was^ f^^ "immature." Kennedy
 
responded that both he and"the vice president" came to
 
Congress in 1946i"i've been there now for fourteen years,"
 
said Kennedy, ''the same period of time that he has, so that
 
our experience in government'is comparable" (New York Times
 
28}. \
 
Kehnedy found an opportunity 1ater in the debate to
 
again equate his eJ^perience with that of Nixon's while
 
subtly drawing comparisons between himself and Abraham
 
Lincoln in the vot^^ minds. He said, "Abraham Lincoln
 
came to the pre^^^ in 1860 after a rather little known
 
Session in the House of Representatives and after being
 
defeated for the Senate in '58 and was a distinguished
 
president" (New York Times 28>, He then told voters that
 
there is no certain road to the presidency and again
 
reminded them that he had been in Congress for fourteen
 
'^years.. • v
 
Kennedy's opening and cldsing statements and responses
 
to questions conveyed a more visionary and inspiring message
 
than Nixpn'S business-like review of the facts and what
 
should be done. Charles H. Percy, chairman of the
 
Republican Platform Committee, Said that ''Mr. Nixon had
 
'countered with facts' while Senator Kennedy 'spoke of the
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future' " (New York Times 29 However, Percy's derision of
 
Kennedy's fprward-looking rhetoric showed no Understanding
 
of the positive impact of this type of speech on the voters.
 
Kennedy was calling the nation together as an
 
invincible freedom force against the tyranny of Communism
 
which was threatening the world. "If the United States
 
fails he pronounced in his opening statement, "then the
 
whole cause of freedom fails. And I think it depends in
 
great measure on what we do here in this country" (New York
 
Times 28).
 
Kennedy then focused this evil threat of Gommunism in
 
Khrushchev/ thus providing Americans with a real person, a
 
villain, to be on guard against. Kennedy stated:
 
We discuss tonight domestic issues, but i would
 
not want that to be any implication to be given
 
that this does not involve directly our struggle
 
with Mr. Khrushchev for survival. Mr. Khrushchev
 
is in New York and he maintains the Gommunist
 
offensive throughout the world because of the
 
productive power of the soviet union itself (New
 
York Times 28).
 
Because Kennedy could tell viewers that Khrushchev was
 
in New York, on their own native soil, it heightened the
 
importance and urgency of the issue of warding off this
 
impending threat. He was also able, through this tactic,
 
to keep his campaign theme--making America strong to fight
 
off the impending threat of Gommunism--in a debate which was
 
to be focused solely upon domestic issues. Jamieson
 
illustrates the importance of public figures' use of
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villains and heroes when she writes; "At any moment in the
 
life of a republic, the public can viscerally distinguish
 
those presumed to be villainous from those presumed to be
 
virtuous. Of svich assumptions of virtue and villainy
 
political discourse is made. Countering them is difficult-­
capitalizing on them simple" (Dirtv Politics. 44).
 
Kennedy capitalized on heroes by invoking popular U.S.
 
presidents in his speech, thus forming an identification in
 
the voters' minds between himself and these presidents'
 
successful policies. Abraham Lincoln appeared in the first
 
sentence of Kennedy's opening statement. Franklin Roosevelt
 
and his policies appeared twice in the opening statement.
 
In Kennedy's first response, he stated: "I come out of
 
the Democratic party, which in this century has produced
 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman and
 
which supported and sustained these programs which I've
 
discussed tonight" (New York Times 28). In this statement,
 
Kennedy is blatantly identifying himself with these
 
presidents as if to say, "I am like them. They were
 
successful; I will be just as successful. If you agreed
 
with their administration, you should vote for me."
 
Kennedy continued to invoke past presidents in his
 
responses to questions. "Mr. Truman" and Abraham Lincoln
 
appeared in his third response and Franklin Roosevelt
 
appeared once more in the last response of the evening.
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Nixon, in contrast, only once called upon the name of other
 
presidents when he compared the records of Truman and
 
Eisenhower.
 
Besides his use of heroes and villains, Kennedy
 
employed two rhetorical devices in his speech which Atkinson
 
attri-butes to m charismatic speakers: lists of
 
three and contrastive pairs. Both of these appear in
 
Kennedy's prepared opening statement.
 
Atkinson describes a cpntrastiyepai^ as an antithesis
 
in which "a common and highly effective technique for
 
attracting attentioh (i.e. a puzzle) is used as a
 
preliminary to supplying a clever pUiich^^^^ l solution).
 
Kennedy begins his opening statement in the first debate
 
with a contrasting pair involving "the election of 1860" and
 
"the election of 1960"
 
In the election of 1860, Abraham Lincoln said the
 
question was Whether this natiohspuld exist half-

slave or half-free.
 
In the election Of I960, and with the World
 
around us, tiie question is whet^ will
 
exist half-slave or half-free; whether it will
 
move in the direction of freedom, in the direction
 
of the road that we are taking, or whether it will
 
move in the direction of slaverv (New York Times
 
•: ■ ; ■ ■■■ ■ ■ :::4-r;?8.) .■ ;^V: :• ;; ■„ / "' ■/;; 
The "puzzle" Kennedy presents his audience in the first 
sentence is the question of whether, in 1860, the nation 
could exist half-slave/half-free. The "punch line" to this 
puzzle is a new, but similar question: whether, in 1960, 
the world will exist haif-slave/half-free. In this 
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contrastive pair, the first sentence describes a nation
 
considering its present status (whether it could continue to
 
exist half-slave/half-free). The second sentence describes
 
the entire world considering its future (whether it will
 
exist half-slave/half-free). The basis for the contrast is
 
a convenient 100 years (1860 to 1960) and the importance of
 
two elections,
 
A second contrastive pair that Kennedy used in his
 
opening statement also relied upon comparisons between past
 
and present
 
In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt said in his
 
inaugural that this generation of Americans has a
 
rendezvous with destiny.
 
I think our generation of Americans has the
 
same rendezvous with destiny (New York Times 28).
 
Again, a time contrast appears, reminding voters of
 
important decisions of the past that impinged upon present
 
circumstances. It is noteworthy, as well, that in the first
 
sentence of both of the above contrastive pairs, Kennedy
 
invokes a successful president of the past. In the second
 
sentence of each contrastive pair, as Kennedy describes the
 
current state of affairs, the implication is that the
 
solution to the situation or the accomplishment of the task
 
can only be performed by him, since he is identifying the
 
problem and pointing the direction to take.
 
Atkinson explains the rhetorical benefit of contrastive
 
pairs when he states:
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Contrasts work in such a way as to have
 
considerable advantages both for projecting a
 
completion point and for delivering a punch line
 
that is likely to appeal to an audience in a way
 
that is similar to that of the punch line of a
 
good joke. If the speaker can present his
 
audience with some sort of puzzle, he stands a
 
good chance of arousing their curiosity, and thus
 
giving them more of an incentive to pay attention.
 
They will then be in a good position tp recognize
 
and appreciate whatever soltition is provided by
 
the punch line. (73)
 
Lists of three, as described by Atkinson, can be either
 
the same word repeated three times, such as in "We shall
 
fight, fight, fight," or the same word used at the beginning
 
of each phrase in a list of three. The rhetorical advantage
 
to this three-fold repetition is that it provides speakers
 
"with a way of underlining or giving progressively more
 
emphasis to the point being made, and doing so in such a way
 
as to give the impression that all possibilities have been
 
covered and there is nothing else to be said on the matter"
 
(Atkinson 159, 160).
 
Kennedy employs lists of three in three consecutive
 
paragraphs at the beginning of his opening statement, which
 
creates a rhythmic momentum in his speech similar to that
 
created by cheers at a sports event. In the first list of
 
three, Kennedy repeats "the kind of"; "The kind of country
 
we have here, the kind of society we have, the kind of
 
strength we build in the United States will be the defense
 
of freedom." Not only does Kennedy enliven his speech with
 
this device, but he also chooses to focus upon the visionary
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topic of what type of country, society and strength
 
Americans h^^^ that his knowledge of the
 
issues that affect Anierica are informed by an overall vision
 
of this country.
 
ken follows this statement with anQther
 
list of three (although the faulty parallel grammatical
 
structure in the third phrase diminishes the effect
 
somewhat). He says, "If we do well here. if we meet our
 
obligations, if we're moving ahead, then I think freedom
 
will be secure around the world."
 
In the next paragraph, Kennedy repeats the phrase "are
 
we" three times: "Are we doing as much as we can do, are we
 
as strong as we should be, are we as strong as we must be."
 
In this statement, as well as the previous list of three in
 
which 'fwe" is focused upon, Kennedy includes himself with
 
his listeners as he implies that personal action is required
 
to ensure that America's strength is sufficient to promote
 
world-wide freedom. Interestingly, whenever Nixon used "we"
 
during this first debate, it was in reference to either him
 
and Kennedy or as an inclusive reference to the Republican
 
Party, never as an inclusive reference to Nixon and other
 
Americans.
 
The contrastive pairs and lists of three added a
 
dynamic, "visionary, poetic sense to Kennedy^s speech; that
 
made Nixon's predictable repetition of facts and proposals
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seeiti dull iii comparison. iBerry lends credence to the power
 
of Kennedy's use of memorable phrases rhthe^^ a reliance
 
upon quoting facts when he writes, "When Kennedy proclaimed
 
that the time was ripe 'to get this country moving again,'
 
he was referring principally to improving the national
 
economy and to closing the alleged missile gap. But these
 
goals implied larger matters of national character,
 
strength, and prestige" (54).
 
Barber describes the success of the Kennedy style in
 
the following statement
 
...Kennedy'S personal cool, his critical stance
 
toward self'-satisfaction, his call for a higher
 
standard of performance, and his thirst for
 
action--or some part of symbiosis of those--fit
 
the mood of the young, and, increasingly in a
 
culture where the young are thought to show the
 
way, the not so young. After the television
 
debates with Nixon, Kennedy was remembered not so
 
much for what he said as for the impression of
 
expertise, precision, and jud^ent he Cbnveyed"
 
(360).
 
Kennedy had successfully used the debates as he had intended
 
to: to prpve his experience and competence as a leader and
 
project a winning image to the American public.
 
When Kennedy used the I960 televised presidential
 
debates to promote his^image to the American voters, he
 
showed tlie?way for future presidential candidates who would
 
use this same method of winning over voters- The first
 
Kennedy-Nixon debate clearly established for future
 
candidates the importance of image over issues, visuals over
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speech. Thirty-two years of repetition of this type of
 
performance informed the candidates in the 1992 televised
 
presidential debates that how they appeared held greater
 
weight with voters than what they said. Yet, although the
 
importance of image over issues remained constant, styles of
 
presentation had changed.
 
As will be shown in the next chapter, informality and
 
brevity of response signal the changes that have occurred in
 
the evolution of televised presidential debates. The reason
 
for the appearance of these qualities can be traced back to
 
the importance of image over issues.
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Conclusion
 
Both Kennedy and Clinton created an image to meet voter
 
expectations by accentuating their positives and minimizing
 
their negatives, yet their attempt to project and maintain
 
that image through the televised presidential debates was
 
affected by both the emerging technology of television and
 
evplving voter expectations of how a candidate should act.
 
Kennedy's invitation to the press to view scenes from his
 
private life (albeit staged^ a floodgate of
 
media scrutiny which has plagued candidates and informed
 
voters eyer sihce.^ Government scandals/ such as Watergate,
 
and ineptness, such as the Vietnam War, created distrust in
 
the public. At the same time, the emerging prominence of
 
teievision created an exi?ectati6h in viewers of receiving
 
information iinmedi^tely arid in compact segments, such as the
 
60 second ads they had become so accustomed to. Both the
 
voters' increasing familiarity with television and their
 
increasing disillusionment with political candidates and
 
government, shaped their expectations of how candidates
 
should act in a televised presidential debate,
 
In comparing the rhetorical styles of two televised
 
presidential debates, thirty years apart, it must be
 
determined what changes have occurred and why. Although as
 
thproughsarialysla of rhetorical evolution would require
 
compiling data from all televised presidential debates/ the
 
tvito debates examined iri this do contain major elements
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that are representative of the progressioh of rhetorical
 
style over the past thirty years.
 
The most notable differences in the current debate
 
style when cpmpared to thie 1960 debate are: (1) informality
 
(as seen in a more conversatipnal style and personal
 
statement;s); and (2) breyity pf response and statements. It
 
is, perhaps, the voters' expectation of being allowed into
 
the private lives of candidates in order to judge their
 
mental and ethical traits that brought about a more informal
 
atmosphere to televised presidential debates. The second
 
factor, brevity, most certainly came about d^e to the
 
technology of television, which created the expectation in
 
viewers of short segments of information.
 
Although the format of the 1992 debate allowed a
 
greater amount of informality than most contemporary
 
debates/ it is feflectlye of the expectations of the voters
 
who, althpugh interested in candidate positions on important
 
issues, hope to find instances during televised presidential
 
debates from which they can judge what they assume to be the
 
character of the candidates. This can best be done when
 
there is a greater amount of exchange between the candidates
 
than when, as in 1960 and other earlier debates, the strict
 
format of the debate minimized spontaneous exchanges between
 
candidates.
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Alan Harrington real that, even in the 1960 debate,
 
voters were using the event to assess the governing
 
capabilities of the candidates when he desbribed it as
 
first great, nationwide personnel interview in history"
 
(Political Television. 60), Voters who read the transcript
 
of the debate in the paper the next day or who listened to
 
the debate on radio, could not benefit from tbe full ;
 
spectrum of factors afforded them by viewing the event on 
television, such as Nixon's pasty, sweating face and 
Kennedy's confident eye contact. Kennedy's planned 
presentation of a positive image and Nixon's unplanned ■i 
presentation of a negative one were lost on that portion of 
the debate audience which either listened to the event on 
radio or read about it in the newspaper. 
Jamieson chronicles the reasons for voters increasingly 
using the debates to judge what they perceive to be the 
candidates' character when she writes 
One powerful factor propelling candidates, 
press, and the public toward press conferences and 
debates is the disillusionment that followed the 
revelations of Vietnam and Watergate. Voters 
sought additional sourGes of evidence about those 
who would lead. The 'character? of the candidate 
become more salient. The conftohtatlonS debates 
create seemed one way to test the character of the 
candidates (Presidential Debates. 109) . 
Once voters became aware that the president could make 
mistakes as well as be dishonest, they began to give the 
presidential candidate's ethical and mental traits 
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prominence over the candidate's position on important
 
issues. It was known by voters that issues could be
 
forgotten or changed once an elected president took office,
 
but a person's basic nature could not so easily be changed.
 
Thus, voters began to depend upon the televised presidential
 
debates as an important forum for discovering or confirming
 
their opinions about candidates.
 
Confrontation in both the 1960 and 1992 televised
 
debates could be described more as an encounter or an
 
exchange of ideas than an aggressive action. The most
 
common form of confrontation seen in these debates is an
 
interruption for the purpose of correcting another speaker.
 
By keeping aggression at a minimum, candidates are able to
 
promote an image of themselves as fair and kind, thus
 
increasing their likability factor. In the first 1960
 
presidential debate, there was only one interruption of a
 
speaker. This occurred when Kennedy interrupted a
 
questioner three times in succession to correct his
 
misinterpretation of Kennedy's past statements.
 
Although Kennedy and Nixon sometimes responded to
 
statements made by each other, these responses were always
 
done within their properly allotted turn for answering a
 
question. Thus, the voters were able to judge these
 
candidates by the way they looked, the way they talked, what
 
they said, and hOW they responded to pressure, i.e., a live
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televised debate, seen by millions of voters. Yet/ the
 
voters could not judge the candidates by how they responded
 
to their opponent. The only interaction Kennedy and Nixon
 
engaged in during this debate was looking at bach other,
 
perhaps because addressing each other directly during the :
 
debate would haVe appeared out of line and thus/in 196
 
extremely confrontational.
 
In contrast, the second 1992 presidential debate
 
contained several interruptions of candidates by each other
 
and "off-the-cuff" comments, creating a conversational tone.
 
For instance, when Clinton was responding to a questioner
 
who asked if the candidates could stop "trashing" each
 
other. Bush took exception to one of his statements and
 
interrupted, saying, "Please don't get into the Washington
 
Post." Clinton, momentarily caught off guard, responded to
 
Bush, saying, "You don't have to believe it." This brief
 
exchange between the two candidates allowed voters to make a
 
deeper assessment of their communication styles than they
 
received in 1960 when candidates simply responded to
 
questions with well-rehearsed position statements. This
 
type of assessment would allow voters to make the logical
 
assumption that how a candidate deals with the stressful
 
interruptions during a national televised debate might
 
reflect how a candidate deals with stressful communication
 
as president.
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Interestingly, Bush's comment, abovfr^^ be seen as
 
either a positiye or hegative for hiin• It could prove that
 
Bush was, indeed, fed up with incorrect statements from the
 
press, which would align him positively with many voters who
 
felt the same way. Also, his comment could be seen as sign
 
of strength because he was not afraid to make what might be
 
an unpopular comment in order to keep the debate moving
 
along factual lines. Negatively, Bush's comment could prove
 
that he was a "whiner" and that he could interrupt at
 
inappropriate times.
 
Clinton's response to^^ ^^B since he was in a defensive
 
position under Bush's "attack," could only be seen in a
 
positive light because he was not the aggressor in this
 
confrontation and gave a conciliatory statement in response.
 
There are several more instances in this debate in
 
which the candidates either have a short back-and-forth
 
exchange with each other or with the moderator. The
 
frequency of this type of encounter creates for the viewer a
 
more informal, conversational "debate" or "roundtable"
 
discussion than the more constrained styles of past
 
televised presidential debates and, thus, allows voters more
 
factors with which toi judge the candidate. For instance,
 
these unplanned exchanges preseht instances to the
 
candidates which they jmay not have planned for before the
 
debate, thus increasing the amount of spontaneous responses
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each candidate must provideV These exchange^^^ provide
 
feedback to the voters on how a candidate responds in
 
different situations—stressful or friendly—which might
 
also indicate how this candidate responds in similar
 
situations while in office when national security might be
 
at stake, simply respondihg to questions, as Kennedy and
 
Nixoh did in 1960, only shows voters how the future
 
president might act in a press Conferencei
 
Brevity of response, the second factbrQ
 
mentioned above, also adds to the perceiVed informality of
 
contemporery debates since this supports the conversational
 
tone. The reason for shrinking the time alloted for
 
candidate resppns^e^^^ can be iraced in the evolution of radio 
and then television. when radio first appeared in American 
homes, hour-long speeches were the norm to be replaced by 
half-hour speeches in the 1940s. By the mid-50s, air time 
costs ahd the dwindling attention of iisteners caused 
politicans to reduce their air-time to five minutes. This 
was replaced in the 197OS by the sixty-second ad {Jamieson, 
Eloquence 9-10) ■ 
Before radio and television, iAmericahs were not
 
accustomed to receiving information in short seigments. All
 
they were offered were long speeches at political rallies
 
and verbose newspaper stories. Even newspaper advertising,
 
before the prominence of television, carried lengthy
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messages rather than the mainly visual ads that are offered
 
today. Television created a visual society; Americans
 
accustomed themselves to receiving messages through
 
pictures. This visual method of gathering information was
 
quicker and more closely resembled the type of assessment
 
made about how someone looked (i.e., their image) rather
 
than what they said or included in their resume.
 
Jamieson provides reasons for why television has
 
changed political discourse when she writes
 
,..American audiences accustomed to the half-

hour sitcom are unlikely to sit for hours as
 
candidates detail their positions on television.
 
Long speeches are not only taxing, but expensive,
 
especially if more than two candidates join in
 
debate. Solutions to the time crunch must take
 
account of the episodic character of television
 
programming and respond to the viewing habits of
 
the modern audience (Presidential Debates 195­
196).
 
The main reason why television changed political discourse
 
was because Americans depended upon television mainly for
 
entertainment value, such as the sitcoms mentioned by
 
Jamieson or the popular game shows. Americans did not
 
expect television to provide informative depth about
 
important issues.
 
In fact, televised political debates were set up to
 
resemble television game shows with the two contestants
 
vying for the grand prize (the presidency), the journalists
 
acting as the emcees, and television audiences looking for
 
positive or negative reactions from the "contestants"
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depending upon how the game was going for them. Brevity of
 
response and spontaneity were expected, and these factors
 
became more prominent during televised presidential debates
 
between 1960 and 1992.
 
In the first Kennedy-Nixon debate, commentator HowaM^^^
 
K. Smith informed the audience that each candidate would be
 
allowed "an opening statement of approximately eight
 
minutes' duration and a closing statement of approximately
 
three minutes' duration" (New York Times. September 27,
 
i960, 28). There was also a three-minute time allotment for
 
responding to questions. It is indicative of Nixon's
 
misunderstanding of the television audience's desire for
 
entertainment and brevity when he responded to reportersv
 
after the debate, that "the three-minute limitation on
 
answering questions was not sufficient to develop a point"
 
(New York Times. September 27, 1960, 28). Nixop W^^
 
mistaken in placing issues over image.
 
In the second presidential debate of 1992, moderator
 
Carole Simpson told the audience that each candidate would
 
be allowed two minutes for a closing statement but did not
 
inform them of any response time allotments. However, one
 
of her main duties that night was to continually inform each
 
candidate toward the end of his response time that it was
 
time to close. These time reminders increased in frequency
 
from the middle of the debate to the end and included such
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interuptions as: "Very briefly," "Sorry to cut you short,"
 
"One brief point?" "Brief," "Can you wrap it up?" "I'm
 
sorry, I'm going to have to...," "I don't want to sound-bite
 
you, but...," "We have just a little bit of time left...."
 
Listening to this type of time management of the
 
candidates' responses, a viewer might either feel grateful
 
that the moderator was shortening the statements or anxious
 
that there might not be enough time left to hear all that
 
the candidates had to say. Either way, the tenor of the
 
debate was that of a race against time, which allowed voters
 
to judge how the candidates reacted to interruptions and
 
time pressures. It also informed the viewers of whether a
 
candidate could think on his feet" and get to the point
 
quickly. Interestingly, none of the three candidates
 
complained (at least in public) that they were not given
 
enough time to sufficiently develop their answers. They
 
perhaps realized that voters were judging how they presented
 
themselves, not necessarily what they said.
 
By comparison, the 1960 debate was almost sedate due to
 
the total lack of interruptions by speakers except the
 
instance of Kennedy stopping a reporter's questions in order
 
to correct him. There were no such interruptions of
 
candidates by Howard K. Smith to remind them that their time
 
was up. This lack of interruptions had the effect of
 
lending an extremely formal tone to the 1960 debate.
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Regardless of the changes In political discoufse that
 
have been effected by television, some rhetorical principles
 
remain constant. One of these factors is the reluctance of
 
candidates to appear too aggressive when attacking an
 
opppnent Oh policy or character issues. Offensive tactics
 
thai: are overdone or wrongly timed cause the voters to
 
unsympathetic towards the petoetrator. This is one of the
 
reasons why candidates request moderators and refuse a face-

off in televised debates.
 
Bennett proposes three pragmatic rules that govern
 
personal attacks within political discourse and that have
 
remained constant within this century. These rules are:
 
"(a) one uses offensive formats when one is the underdog,
 
(b) one uses defensive formats when one is the front runner,
 
and (c) one claims to be above these personal concerns at
 
all times" (225). Bennett explains the skill involved in
 
following these conflict rules when he writes: "These
 
symbolic tests of personal mettle involve substantial
 
precision in rhetorical format" (225-226).
 
one eto^Pi® of h political candidate who failed to
 
follow the ritualistic rules of political discourse is
 
Robert Dole during the 1976 vice presidential debates.
 
Dole's answers contained "sarcasm, gratuitous humor, and,
 
more often than customary in political discourse, an
 
impugning of his opponents' integrity" (Jamieson,
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Presidential Debates. l51). Because Dole went beyond
 
necessary limits in attacking his opponent, he violated
 
voters' sense of proi)riety concerning political discourse.
 
CphsSquently, Dole'S erroneous judgment in how to publicly
 
conduct himself reflected badly on his image as a potential
 
president. Voters could not place theitconfiden in a
 
candidate who approached problems (including opponents) in
 
such a negative manner. The error of his offensive attacks
 
was obvious in a statement he made in 1988 when he was
 
running for president: "They told me to go forVthS jugular.
 
I did. My own" (USA Today. November 9, 1987, 4A).
 
Rubin conveys a sense of Kennedy's and Nixon's
 
reluctance to appear too confrpntstional in their first
 
debate when he quotes Russell Biaker as commenting that the
 
two men"argued genteelly" and that the two candidates'
 
"exchanges were distinguished by suavity, earnestness and
 
courtesy that suggested that the two men were more concerned
 
about 'image projection' to their...television audience than
 
about scoring debate points" (53-54).
 
certainly Nixon did not want to look confrontational,
 
but this was not so much a case of image projection as
 
protecting his image. M understand what a
 
television camera could do to his image, much less do for
 
it. Even without the cameras, Nixon would probably have
 
been polite because this was his natural demeanor in
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conducting business. However, Kennedy wae on bis best
 
behavidr, because re were; that his private
 
conversations were filled with curse words, off-color
 
remarks and ranting criticisms of his critics, especially
 
the media when they portrayed hi^ a bad way.
 
Ih the second 1992 presidential debate, two audience
 
members requested that the caindidates stop "trashing their
 
ppponents' character" and "focus on the issues and not the
 
personality and the mud." Since these guestipns were among
 
the first four posed to the candidates, and no
 
Gonfrontations had yet occurred, it must be assumed that the
 
questioners were basing their requests upon the candidates'
 
ads and the news sound bites that they had been subjected to
 
thus far in the campaign.
 
Howeyer, these requests did effectively dampen any
 
aggressive confrontations that might have occurred in the
 
debate and put the candidates in a position of having to
 
address any subtle accusations or insinuations about them by
 
setting the record straight (in an offended tone) rather
 
than reacting with accusations against their opponent. when
 
Perot insinuated that Clinton paid otljefs: tb ;do h thinking
 
for him, Clinton defended himself saying, "Wait a minute. I
 
want to say just one thing hw, Ross, in fairness
 
ideas I express are mine...." When Clinton implied that the
 
Republicans had allowed the deficit to build up for twelve
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years and proposed a plan to fix it, Bush responded in a
 
victimized manner saying "Well, I'm a little cohfused here,
 
hecause 1 don't see how you can grow the deficit down by
 
raising people's taxes." Bush was pleading confusion to
 
appear victimized/ but h^ was, in reality, implying that
 
Clinton's plan was ineffective. Both Clinton's and Bush's
 
response to a subtle attack was to victimize themselves and,
 
in a proper tone of voice, give their version of the facts.
 
Certainly, it can be said that the format of these
 
televised debates minimize occasions for clashes between
 
candidates. The insertion of a questioner or moderator to
 
which the candidates respond enables the candidates to avoid
 
a direct face-off. Swerdlow gives credence to this view
 
When he writes
 
Much of the controversy surrounding debates
 
concerns format: Should there be a moderator? How
 
about eliminating the panel of questioners? Why
 
not just put the candidates on stage alone and let
 
them confront each other? Those who ask such
 
questions usually assume that more truth and
 
better information will emerge from a face-to-face
 
meeting without intermediaries. But in the real
 
world candidates do not want—and have not
 
accepted—face-to-face confrontations. Such
 
confrontations, they fear, could force them to
 
appear unpresidential or overly aggressive....
 
Debates also document the fact that face-to-face
 
meetings...can easily digress into distracting
 
pettiness (141).
 
American voters have never seen a televised presidential
 
debate in which the candidates face-off on the issues
 
without an intermediary. Therefore, they do not expect it.
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 A debate moderator gives the impression that the debate is
 
controlled— that important issues will be raisedy that each
 
Candidate's time will be fairly allotted, and that tiie ;
 
debate will move along at a good pace and not become
 
stalemated on one issue. Leaving out the adderatbr might
 
cause voters to feel uneasy about which candidate is contrbi
 
of the debate. With the moderator, voters cah focus their
 
attention on how candidates respond to the questions rather
 
than how the debate is being conducted. ;
 
At any rate, these "joint press conferences" as they
 
have been called, give the voters a unique opportunity to
 
judge presidential candidates upon their governing ability
 
and knowledge of the issues. McKinnon, Tedesco and Raid, in
 
their study of the 1^92 presidential debates, write; ^
 
y	 Research has concluded that debates have the
 
ability to educate and inform voters, to influence
 
perceptions of candidates, and to impact voting
 
preference and behavior.... Mediated debates
 
provide viewers or listeners with glimpses of the
 
candidate ab a pebspn and how the cahdidates, if
 
elected, will shape our society and culture" (117­
IIS).
 
The majority of voters, when they watch a televised
 
presidential debate, are, indeed^ using the event to judge
 
how a candidate will govern if elected. The mariher in which
 
a candidate proposes to solve various contemporary problems
 
is not as important a factor as how the candidate responds
 
to stress, frames his responses, and interacts with the
 
other candidate(s).
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The proposals for governing that a candidate offers can
 
be changed or shelved once that person takes office. But
 
voters have learned that a person's propensity to act
 
certain ways in given situations does not change when he or
 
she takes office. This is why voters now put more stress
 
upon judging what sort of person the candidate seems to be
 
rather than listening to what a candidate says. This is
 
also why a candidate's creation of a positive image to meet
 
the demands of the voters is of utmost importance.
 
When John F. Kennedy used the media to promote his
 
image, American voters were dazzled by a display they had
 
never before witnessed in a political candidate, only in
 
Hollywood stars, whose business is make-believe. Certainly,
 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the idea of a
 
president becoming intimate with his constituents when he
 
broadcast his "fireside chats" over the radio and appeared
 
on the cinema in movie theaters. Yet Kennedy took that
 
intimacy with the public one step further when he appeared
 
on television in the debates, promoted himself visually in
 
television commercials, and invited photographers to record
 
supposedly private moments with his wife and child.
 
Since Kennedy's media display in 1960, voters have come
 
to expect this access to political candidates. A public
 
grown cynical over government scandals has come to rely on
 
how a candidate presents him or herself to judge how that
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person will govern. It is no longer of utmost importance
 
what a candidate says but, rather, who that candidate says
 
he or she is. Thus, a candidate now, naturally, employs
 
Burke's rhetorical theory of "identification" in which an
 
image of him or herself is created for the voters to
 
identify with. The televised presidential debates are an
 
essential part of candidates' display of their image, when
 
voters will either have their judgment of candidates
 
confirmed or finally decided.
 
Televised presidential debates have now become the norm
 
in the American political system because voters demand this
 
close, somewhat spontaneous presentation of the candidates
 
in order to make their most informed judgment. Voters'
 
current uncertainty about the objectivity of press coverage
 
of the candidates, as well as the extreme nonobjectivity of
 
campaign ads, have left the televised debates as the only
 
arena in which they can judge for themselves the merits of
 
the candidates.
 
If the current trend in the style and format of the
 
televised presidential debates continues, voters can expect
 
to see informality, brevity and minimized confronations in .
 
these nationwide presentations by the candidates.
 
Additionally, voters who have learned that a candidate's
 
mental and ethical traits are of the utmost importance in
 
determining that person's ability to govern, will demand
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more, and possibly, new ways of judging candidates'
 
capabilities. This demand by voters will, in turn, cause
 
candidates to seek out even more effective ways of
 
determining, creating, and projecting an image of themselves
 
that will fulfill the voters' expectations.
 
Clearly, both Kennedy and Clinton entered their
 
respective presidential races with the negative factors of
 
low recognition, youth, and inexperience standing between
 
them and the presidency. Yet, they were both, through their
 
careful preparation of an image to meet voters'
 
expectations, able to turn those negatives into positive
 
images of youth and energy, capitalizing on America's
 
periodic tendency to reinvent itself. Each man's careful
 
construction of an image that could meet America's
 
expectations resulted in a victory against great odds that
 
could be called a "triumph of timing and temperament"
 
(Morrow 24). Kennedy captured America's imagination with
 
his "New Frontier" and Clinton reproduced that success with
 
his "New Generation."
 
The famous photograph, showing President Kennedy
 
shaking hands with a 16-year-old Bill Clinton in the Rose
 
Garden, was used by the Clinton campaign as proof of
 
"passing the torch." The implication was that an aura of
 
leadership and approval had been passed from Kennedy to
 
Clinton. However, the reality of what Kennedy gave to
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Clinton (as well as other successful presidential candidates
 
after 1950) was an understanding of how to create an image
 
that would meet America's expectations and how to use
 
television to project that image.
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